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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1942, a few months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor launched World War II in the Pacific, the United States Army, acting under authority granted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and confirmed by Congress, summarily rounded up the entire ethnic Japanese population living on the nation's Pacific Coast. These American citizens and longtime residents—some 112,000 men, women, and children—were packed into military holding centers for several weeks or months and then transported under armed guard to the interior of the country. There they were confined in a network of hastily built camps constructed and operated by a new federal agency, the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Although some of these inmates were able after a time to leave the camps and resettle outside the West Coast, most remained in captivity for the duration of the war.

This official action, commonly called the internment of Japanese Americans but more accurately termed their confinement, has often been referred to as the worst civil rights violation by the federal government during the twentieth century. While the government's actions did bring significant pain and hardship to those affected, there was no mass torture or starvation, and sympathetic officials and outside workers worked to ease the situation. In that sense, the suffering of the inmates in the WRA camps was not comparable with that of the masses caught in the agony of total war or targeted by tyrannical regimes—the prisoners in the Nazi death camps, for instance, or the Chinese people under the Japanese occupation—or with the historic degradation of African Americans, although such comparisons are inherently troublesome. Rather, what is particularly noteworthy about the confinement of the Issei and Nisei is its fundamentally ironic character:[1] it was an arbitrary and antidemocratic measure put into effect by a government devoted to humanitarian aims,

which occurred as a part of a war the nation was waging for the survival of world freedom. Through its official actions, undertaken in the name of national security, the United States not only brought suffering to its own people but handicapped its war effort. The federal government diverted massive resources to building and maintaining an extensive network of camps to confine an entire population of citizens and permanent residents, people whose loyalty was shaken by official actions premised on their group disloyalty.[2] The WRA's total budget through 1945 was $162 million. In addition, the army spent an estimated $75 million to round up and remove Japanese Americans. In vivid contrast, the Japanese community in Hawaii, whose members were not singled out for wholesale confinement, made exemplary contributions in the form of volunteer soldiers and war workers. Finally, army officers and Justice Department officials, who sought to assure the orderly release of inmates from the camps and their scattering into communities outside, resorted to manipulating evidence and covering up information about the initial removal policy to defend it from judicial review.

The wartime confinement of Japanese Americans remains not only a critical event in the Asian American experience, but a resonant point of reference and touchstone of commemoration for diverse groups of Americans. Dozens of works have appeared describing the signing of Executive Order 9066, the presidential decree that undergirded the action, as well as the court challenges to the government's actions. An equally large literature has sprung up on the camp experience of the inmates—their family relations, their schooling, their resistance, and even their artistic creations. These works have rightly focused on Japanese Americans as important actors in shaping the nature of government policy and camp life, despite the numerous limitations on their freedom and the economic and psychological burdens they faced as a result of confinement. The inmates helped staff and operate schools, churches, hospitals, and cooperative stores. In conjunction with camp administrators, and sometimes in defiance of them, they organized social groups, sports competitions, musical bands, literary magazines, and crafts classes. They also struggled to preserve autonomy from invasive camp administrations. Using their limited channels of self-government, they called for redress of grievances, and on several occasions they expressed their resistance through organized strikes or even rioting. More negatively, hard-line factions of inmates organized harassment and sometimes violence against suspected informers, or those considered too friendly to camp administrators.

Finally, a growing literature has emerged on the later movement by former inmates and their children for compensation for their confinement and for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decisions upholding it. The so-called redress movement triumphed in 1988, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act, granting all those affected by Executive Order 9066 an official apology and a $20,000 redress payment. Meanwhile, citing official misconduct and manipulation of evidence at trial, federal courts vacated or overturned the convictions of three Nisei who had challenged their removal.

Given all the attention that these aspects of the wartime experience of Japanese Americans have received—the books, plays, poetry, days of remembrance, museum exhibitions, documentaries, feature films, etc.—it might be wondered what need there is for another historical book on the subject. Indeed, some ten years ago, when I began research on President Roosevelt and the story behind the signing of Executive Order 9066, I was obliged to reject the advice of a distinguished historian who urged me to choose another field of study. How, he asked me, could there possibly be anything new to say on the confinement of Japanese Americans, a matter about which so much had already been published?

The reasons for putting out a new book nevertheless seemed compelling then and are even more so in the case of this volume. First, the camps remain oddly obscure in popular American memory: most ordinary people I have spoken to have never even heard of them. Among those who are informed about the wartime events, there remain serious conflicts over how to interpret their legacy. Were the camps an isolated result of wartime hysteria? How do they fit into the larger history of American racism? What impact did they have on Japanese communities outside the camps? Into the void of public knowledge has stepped a small but tenacious circle of assorted right-wingers and war buffs who continue to deny or rationalize the removal of Japanese Americans from the West Coast and the institution of the camps. Their campaign gained new strength in the post-9/11 crisis, amid the deep national anxiety over immigrants and potential threats to national security. Clearly, the entire subject of Japanese American confinement taps into some deep sources of anxiety, and this makes it call out for clear-minded historical study.

What is more, the existing literature on Japanese Americans does not take account of the profusion of new information (and in a few cases misinformation) that has come to light in recent times. Vast numbers of newly declassified or digitized documents have become available, and

family and oral history archivists have put together innumerable testimonies by Japanese Americans that shed light on particulars of their experience. In the course of my ongoing historical research, I have come across collections of previously unseen or unknown material that deepen our understanding in fundamental ways. Meanwhile, the work of a new generation of scholars has left our understanding of supposedly familiar events altered and enriched.

Therefore, a first purpose of this book is to set down a record of Executive Order 9066 and the wartime Japanese American experience in a clear and digestible fashion. In the process, I will join together elements of the generally accepted narrative with significant new information, so as to form a much-needed synthesis. My goal is naturally to help those readers who are new to this history, but also to deepen the understanding of those who have some experience of it.

As important as that initial goal is, this book has a greater purpose: to expand the contours of discussion on Japanese American confinement beyond the overly narrow framework of time and space in which the subject has been placed. First, my history goes beyond the limits of the wartime period in its discussion of events. The main story of confinement properly begins in the prewar years, with the buildup of suspicion against Japanese Americans and "enemy aliens" generally. One element especially worth exploring is the U.S. government's construction, in the months before war broke out, of what it called concentration camps to hold enemy aliens. This book investigates for the first time how these actions created a climate and momentum for mass arbitrary action against perceived "enemies" after Pearl Harbor.

Conversely, much remains to be said on the long after-history of Japanese American confinement. The postwar era is all but forgotten in conventional narratives, which tend to stop with the end of the fighting and the closing of the camps. Yet it is impossible to understand these events fully without also studying the rapid turnabout of official policy and attitudes toward Japanese Americans in the first years after the war, and the attempts by officials in Congress and the White House to make gestures at restitution. In the same way, the eclipse of the wartime events in public discussion during the 1950s and their gradual reappearance in later years, a matter largely uncovered by existing works, merit discussion. Finally, while a number of writings exist on movements among Japanese Americans for reparations and the granting of redress in the 1980s, the story of the camps does not end with the official apology and payment. In a final

section, I will look at the period since redress was granted, and how recent events and polemics over historical memory and representation contribute to our overall understanding of the wartime actions and reflect their continuing impact upon American national consciousness.

An even more troubling problem with the conventional narrative is that it discusses Executive Order 9066 and the treatment of Japanese Americans only within fixed spatial and national boundaries, as part of internal (and mainland) American history. Yet the confinement policy fits into a wider international—indeed continental—pattern of official treatment of people of Japanese ancestry, and it is imperative to study other areas in order to understand in-depth the experience of West Coast Japanese Americans.[3] The first of these areas is wartime Hawaii, where "local Japanese" constituted the largest single ethnic population and provided the backbone of the labor force. In the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor, army commanders pushed through a declaration of martial law and did not restore the territory to full civilian control until late 1944. Military rule in Hawaii—a unique status in modern American history—was shaped in fundamental ways by the fears of the "local Japanese," on the basis of which army commanders justified and built public support for such steps as abolition of civilian courts and their replacement by military tribunals. Conversely, Japanese residents were the focus of an epic conflict between national leaders who urged their mass confinement and local rulers who resisted these orders. The resulting struggle not only had different results from those on the West Coast but helped shape government policy on Japanese Americans elsewhere.

A similarly gaping hole in standard portraits of Japanese American confinement exists with regard to events in Canada. Like their American counterparts, twenty-two thousand Japanese Canadians from the West Coast of British Columbia were rounded up during the spring of 1942. They were then dispersed to a variety of destinations: road labor camps, sugar beet farms, or settlements in isolated mining villages. Their property was confiscated and sold by official decree, and they were forced to use the funds to pay for their own expenses. The Canadian government ultimately required the Japanese Canadians to choose between resettling outside the West and being deported to Japan, and it undertook the mass deportation of thousands of inmates as soon as the war was over. Astoundingly, no work has ever been published that looks at the history of Executive Order 9066 and the camps in the United States alongside that of the Canadian government's wartime removal and confinement of Jap-

anese Canadians, a series of events that remains all but unknown south of the border.[4] Yet not only is the Canadian experience compelling within itself, but a study of the similarities and differences across the border provides a greater and more balanced perspective on any number of overall questions relating to the Japanese Americans: What drove confinement? What choices existed in administering it? How important were Nisei soldiers in shifting public opinion about the loyalty of the Japanese?

Finally, there is the experience of the Latin American Japanese in North America to consider. Following agreements between the U.S. State Department and the governments of Peru and other Latin American nations, U.S. forces carried off some 2,300 ethnic Japanese (plus larger numbers of ethnic Germans) from their home countries, brought them to the United States, and imprisoned them in an internment camp operated by the Justice Department at Crystal City, Texas. The Mexican government (though it refused to surrender any of its residents to the United States) decreed mass removal of ethnic Japanese from its Pacific coast in 1942 and confiscated their property. As a result, a refugee trail of thousands of people formed to Mexico City and Guadalajara.

This book offers the first extended analysis of confinement in a North American context. In making this claim, I do not wish to mislead the reader—my presentation of events in Canada and of the removal of Latin American Japanese, though based in part on original research, is meant to serve primarily as a counterpoint to and comparison with those in the United States and is thus more summary, notably where the postwar years are concerned. Also, while the history of the Canadian camps has been well documented by scholars, there are few published archival collections, at least in comparison with the print and microfilm resources compiled on Japanese Americans. I therefore rely mostly on secondary sources, and on published primary materials and memoirs where available, rather than repeating research by others in scattered archives.

[1] BACKGROUND TO CONFINEMENT

JAPANESE IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

Although the confinement of Japanese Americans was clearly a war measure, its roots reach as far back as the beginnings of Japanese immigration to North America and to the growth of prejudice against these settlers, the so-called Issei (first generation).

Japan had remained almost completely closed off to the world for more than two centuries when a United States Navy fleet commanded by Commodore Matthew C. Perry was sent to the island empire in 1853. Under the threat of destruction from Perry's gunboats, the Japanese agreed to open their ports to American trade and friendship. The "opening up" of their country and the entry of Americans and other Westerners prompted the Japanese leaders to implement a large-scale strategy of "catching up" with Western technology and ideas in order to protect Japan from foreign domination. In 1868 a group favoring modernization deposed Japan's shogun (military governor) and took power under the aegis of the emperor, whom they restored as official head of the government. In the generation following the so-called Meiji Restoration, Japan developed into a modern industrial state. The leaders of the new government at Tokyo built a powerful military machine, and Japan soon displayed its new prowess in two victories over China in wars during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Under the impetus of the modernizers, the Japanese government began sending students and government observers abroad to study Western societies, and laborers soon followed. In 1868, the very same year as the Meiji Restoration, the then-independent kingdom of Hawaii recruited a pioneer group of some 150 Japanese artisans (who were dubbed the Gannen-mono, or "first-year men") to come work on the sugar planta-

tions of Oahu. Resentful over their treatment by plantation overseers, the Japanese soon left the plantations and settled in Honolulu, whereupon the experiment was abandoned.[1] A year later, a group of Japanese sailed to California and established a short-lived agricultural settlement, the Wakamatsu colony.[2] A few years after, in 1877, a Japanese sailor named Manzo Nagano left his ship to settle in British Columbia and is thereby credited as the first Japanese immigrant to Canada.[3] Emigration nonetheless remained formally illegal in Japan, and few Japanese workers settled in other countries in the immediately succeeding years.

The situation was drastically altered in 1882 by events in the United States, namely, the passage by Congress of the first of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. These acts, born of anti-Chinese racism and pressure by labor unions, journalists, and politicians to end labor competition by Chinese immigrants, barred all laborers of Chinese ancestry from entering the country. For the next sixty years, only a few protected categories of Chinese, such as accredited merchants, students, and ministers, could enter the country legally, and all Chinese were forced to carry passes as proof of legal residence.[4] In 1885, following the completion of the transcontinental Canadian Pacific Railroad upon which masses of Chinese workers had labored, the Canadian government followed suit by imposing the notorious special Head Tax on each Chinese immigrant who wished to enter the country. The amount of this tax rose by 1903 to $500, a vast sum by the standards of the day, and severely limited the number of individuals, especially working-class, who were able to move east to Canada.[5]

The cutoff of Chinese immigration meant that landowners in Pacific Coast areas such as California, where Chinese made up one-half of agricultural laborers by 1884, began to search desperately for other newcomers to take up the arduous and low-paid farm labor work that brought prosperity to the region. Meanwhile, in Hawaii, whose economy depended on production of sugar, planters sought to attract a reliable surplus labor force. Japanese laborers, they concluded, would counterbalance the islands' largely Chinese worker population. Planters would profit from national-based hostility between the two groups, which would work to keep laborers from organizing too closely. With close supervision by the Japanese government, which regarded itself as the protector of its overseas nationals, thousands of young Japanese were recruited by labor contractors for work in Hawaii after 1885. They soon became the dominant group in the islands' plantation labor force.[6] To better assure a stable and controlled worker group, plantation owners ordered recruiters to bring

over a significant percentage of women among laborers and encouraged development of family groups. Plantation owners also (for a time) subsidized the implantation of Buddhist temples in Hawaii, as they were thought to encourage morality and docility in workers.

By the early 1890s, numerous individual Japanese began arriving in the United States. Since contract labor was illegal, they came as independent immigrants, often borrowing the price of their tickets. Many more transmigrated from Hawaii after finishing their contracts there, a movement that expanded once the islands were annexed by the United States in 1898. (Ironically, the white officials and businessmen who favored annexation conjured up the menace of Japanese domination of the islands as the main pretext for supporting a takeover by the U.S. government.)[7] By 1900 there were 24,326 people of Japanese ancestry in the United States, and an estimated 127,000 more Japanese arrived to join them in the seven years that followed.

The emigrants who went to Hawaii and the United States were a fraction of a larger international movement of migrants who left Japan in the early twentieth century. Many of them came from a cluster of prefectures in the southwest of the Japanese island of Honshu that had been hard hit by industrialization.[8] Other Japanese emigrated to escape conscription for military service, especially during Japan's wars. In addition, Okinawans, a disdained minority group whose home islands had been annexed by the Japanese Empire in 1879 and settled by "mainland" Japanese, emigrated in large numbers after the turn of the century, first throughout Asia and the Pacific, then to Hawaii and the North American mainland. Beyond those who went to the United States, a few thousand Japanese immigrant farmworkers and fishermen (many of them having previously settled in Hawaii) entered Canada during the first years of the twentieth century and took up residence on Vancouver Island and the West Coast of British Columbia. Other Japanese immigrated to South America—from 1899 to 1924, some 17,000 immigrants arrived in Peru—or to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, or the South Pacific. For example, several thousand Japanese were recruited as migrant labor on the French South Pacific island colony of New Caledonia, where they worked as miners. The largest number embarked within Asia and settled in Japan's annexed colonies of Korea and Formosa, and later in Japanese-occupied Manchuria.[9]

The newcomers to the West Coast of North America took up jobs at first as farm laborers in rural districts or as domestics and laborers in urban areas. Large groups worked on fishing boats or in fish canneries, and they

formed Japanese-style villages in cannery districts such as Steveston near Vancouver and Terminal Island near Los Angeles. As time went on, significant numbers of Japanese were recruited for seasonal labor in lumber mills or in salmon canning factories in Alaska. Once they had toiled for a number of years in North America, where they could learn new skills and draw much higher wages than in rural Japan, many immigrant laborers were able to save money from their wages in order to buy or lease agricultural land. Through drainage and fertilization techniques inherited from their ancestral homeland, and through intense physical labor, Issei farmers succeeded in transforming marginal land into thriving farms. With help from their growing families, they were successful in growing crops such as strawberries that required too much onerous stoop labor for white farmers to produce. Issei who settled in U.S. West Coast cities such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, or the Canadian cities of Victoria and Vancouver, established themselves in business as fishermen or opened hotels, boarding houses, restaurants, and curio shops.[10] A number worked in gardening and domestic labor (including many students who supported their studies by working as houseboys for elite whites). Although they were barred from liberal professions such as medicine and law, a small fraction of the immigrants did establish themselves as professionals—teachers, newspaper editors, or ministers—within ethnic communities. A tiny handful of the West Coast immigrants, such as actor Sessue Hayakawa, playwright Ken Nakazawa, and political scientist Yamato Ichihashi, found professional employment in the larger community.

The Japanese laborers, even those who did not sign fixed-term contracts, generally came over as *dekasegi* (sojourners), intending to remain for a limited period, and many did go back to Japan. (For example, Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan's foreign minister in the period before Pearl Harbor, lived several years in Oregon as a young man). However, most of those who established themselves on the West Coast gradually abandoned their plans to return home. Their desire to remain was reflected in the powerful body of ethnic institutions they developed, including branches of the Japanese Association (Nihonjinkai) and the Canadian Japanese Association, in Japanese-language (and a few English-language) newspapers, and in religious congregations. They retained a strong sentimental attachment to their Japanese homeland, sent money to bank accounts or relatives in Japan, and kept close ties with the network of consulates maintained by the Japanese government that served to organize and protect overseas communities. Nevertheless, the immigrants demonstrated an ardent de-

sire to adapt themselves to the customs and life of their new home. For example, a significant minority of Issei adopted Christianity—a faith that barely existed in Japan—and even the majority who remained faithful to various strains of Buddhism evolved a hybrid form unknown in Asia, including Western-style elements such as congregational services, Sunday schools, and ministers.

Issei joined in patriotic demonstrations and proclaimed their love for their adopted lands, although they were limited in their claims to belonging. In the United States, the 1790 Immigration Act limited naturalization to white (and, after 1870, African) immigrants and barred Japanese and other Asian aliens from becoming citizens. A few Japanese did succeed in taking out citizenship papers on the grounds that they counted as "white," before the question was definitively decided. Since Issei were unable to naturalize, they could not vote or be licensed for certain professions. By contrast, all native-born children were automatically granted citizenship regardless of their parents' status, a constitutional provision affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1898 case of *Wong Kim Ark*. In Canada, where naturalization remained open, some 16 percent of the total Japan-born population adopted British nationality in the period before World War II, which gave them (at least nominal) citizenship in Canada. However, in part because at that time Canada had no written constitution or bill of rights, Japanese Canadians in British Columbia, like black Americans in the Jim Crow South, faced legal discrimination notwithstanding their status as British subjects.[11]

BEGINNINGS OF ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENTS

For the balance of the nineteenth century, most elite whites on the Pacific Coast welcomed the Japanese, who seemed willing to work hard for modest wages, and who were eager to learn. Still, there was from the beginning a certain amount of nativist hostility in the Anglo-American world to the overseas Japanese because of their racial and cultural difference from the majority—their "heathen" religion, their poor English, and their tendency to congregate in separate communities (often out of necessity). Australia, whose states had restricted Chinese immigration beginning in the 1850s, was the first nation to legislate Japanese exclusion, and its policy served as a precedent and model for other nations. In 1896, one year after Japan's defeat of China in the second Sino-Japanese War demonstrated Tokyo's

growing military progress, various Australian states enacted Japanese exclusion laws. Japanese officials responded by protesting to Australia's imperial masters in Great Britain, who were engaged in forming military and naval alliances with the new power and were anxious not to alienate Japan. The British Parliament disallowed the discriminatory laws, whereupon in 1901 the new Australian Commonwealth government voted an Immigration Restriction Act requiring all immigrants to pass a dictation test in a European language—a version of the "Natal Law," developed by the British for use in South Africa, which restricted Asian immigrants unable to speak European languages. Under further British pressure, the Australians ultimately altered their law to accept the dictation test in any language. In return for this change, and for the Australians' pledge not to pass further discriminatory immigration legislation, the Japanese agreed to an informal "Gentleman's Agreement" (modeled on a deal they had made with the Australian state of Queensland in 1896) through which Tokyo agreed to restrict future visas to a few special categories of workers.[12] The result was a virtual cutoff of Japanese immigration to Australia for the next half-century.[13]

Another British possession, Canada, went through similar wrangling over immigration with the mother country. In 1897, following pressure from a newly formed "Anti-Mongolian Association," British Columbia's legislature passed a law barring Chinese and Japanese aliens from public employment. Two years later, the legislature voted the first of a series of race-based laws that used various stratagems to restrict Japanese immigration. The Dominion government of Prime Minster Wilfrid Laurier disallowed all these laws in order not to disturb British imperial foreign policy toward Britain's Japanese ally.[14] Although officially Japanese subjects had the right of free entry into Canada as a result of Japan's treaty with Great Britain (to which Canada became a signatory in 1906, albeit with expressed reserves on the immigration question), Tokyo agreed to use administrative measures to limit Japanese immigration to Canada in order to calm the situation. As a result of the agreement, and the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese immigration to Canada fell to almost nothing from 1901 to 1905.[15]

In stark contrast to the immigration question, where Japanese and British imperial interests were involved, Laurier did not intervene on purely domestic matters. Most notably, he brought no challenge to British Columbia's 1895 law barring all Chinese and Japanese, regardless of place of birth or citizenship, from voting rights and entry into certain

professions. In 1900 Tomeichi Homma, a naturalized Canadian citizen, successfully challenged the law in a British Columbia court. However, two years later the British Privy Council overturned the court's ruling on appeal and upheld the ban, which remained in effect until 1949.[16]

There was pressure for similar restrictive action against Japanese immigration to the United States. Labor unionists and elected officials—many of whom owed the development of their organizations and their political influence to the earlier movement to stigmatize and exclude Chinese immigrants—seized the opportunity to take a position against the Japanese, employing the same racial stereotyping that had worked so well in the case of the Chinese. By 1900 the American Federation of Labor issued a resolution formally opposing immigration of all Asians. Labor leaders asserted that Japanese were a racially inferior horde that threatened the standard of living of white workers (who nevertheless refused to admit Japanese workers to their unions or assure higher pay for all). Soon after, a coalition of groups in San Francisco staged a mass meeting advocating exclusion of Japanese immigrants, on the grounds that they were racially "unassimilable" and thus incapable of citizenship in a democratic society. In May 1905 labor groups combined to found a joint lobbying and propaganda group, the Japanese Exclusion League.[17] Still, public opinion, especially outside the West Coast, was generally favorable toward Japan as a modern country, while Japanese immigrants were considered cleaner and more intelligent than the despised Chinese. Since the American West Coast was more heavily populated, popular fears of Japanese takeover were less plausible than on the Canadian and Australian frontiers.

After 1905, however, elite opinion about Japanese began to shift, in large part because of the interplay between two factors. One was the self-interest of white farmers and businessmen, who tolerated Japanese immigrants as laborers but were threatened by the growth of Japanese enterprise. The Issei who established farms and businesses on the West Coast shrank the pool of available labor and offered economic competition to elite whites. In addition, their success challenged widespread and accepted notions of white supremacy—their failure to "keep to their place" infuriated whites of all classes. The other catalyst of the anti-Japanese movement was Japan's military strength. In 1904–1905, Japan decisively beat Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and thereby became the dominant naval power in the western Pacific. Japan's military might gave rise to widespread fears among Americans of a "yellow peril" of encroaching Asian world mastery. Homer Lea's *The Valor of Ignorance* (1909), a popu-

lar book, warned of an imminent Japanese military invasion of the Pacific Coast and presented a detailed plan of such an invasion. White agitators, panicked over a potential Japanese invasion, insisted that the immigrants represented the first wave of penetration of the coming conquest.

In the fall of 1906, barely a year after the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War, San Francisco's school board established a new regulation segregating Japanese schoolchildren into separate "oriental" schools. The action, avowedly designed to stigmatize Japanese Americans as undesirables and protest their presence, set off an international crisis. The Japanese government and Japanese public opinion were extremely sensitive to racial discrimination against Japanese abroad. Not only was unequal treatment an affront to their national honor that evoked painful memories of unequal treaties and foreign domination of Japan, but it also encouraged discriminatory treatment elsewhere. President Theodore Roosevelt feared that the school board's action would affront the Japanese enough to plunge the two nations into a useless war. In his annual message to Congress a few weeks after the crisis arose, he denounced the policy as "a wicked absurdity" and, as a conciliatory gesture, proposed that Congress pass legislation explicitly allowing Japanese immigrants to become naturalized citizens (a measure that was rejected, as Roosevelt must have anticipated). Meanwhile, Roosevelt's Justice Department teamed up with Masuji Miyakawa, the only ethnic Japanese attorney admitted to practice before the American bar, in bringing a court challenge to the pupil placement orders.

After several months of effort, Roosevelt finally persuaded the school board to abandon its segregation policy and dropped the lawsuit. In return, the president promised concrete steps to halt Japanese immigration. He signed an immediate executive order barring Japanese aliens in Hawaii from transmigrating to the mainland, and he promised to negotiate an informal "Gentleman's Agreement," as the Australians had done, with the Japanese government to limit further immigration from Japan. Negotiations lasted over a year, during which a series of diplomatic notes were exchanged. These formed together the "Gentlemen's Agreements" of 1907–1908. Under this informal understanding, the United States promised not to enact immigration curbs or discriminatory legislation against Japanese subjects. In return, the Japanese government pledged to refuse passports to manual laborers wishing to travel to the United States. As a result of the agreement, the only Japanese permitted to enter the country were merchants, ministers, leisure travelers, and students. However, un-

like the Chinese admitted as members of "protected classes" under the Chinese Exclusion Act, who were examined at great length by U.S. immigration inspectors, Japan was responsible for controlling the entry of its own nationals, and those Japanese immigrants already admitted to the United States were permitted to bring over their spouses, children, and parents to join them.[18]

As Japanese immigration to the United States subsided, Japanese immigrants (notably "transmigrants" from Hawaii) began arriving in Canada in force. During 1906–1907 some five thousand Japanese, more than double the existing Issei population, entered British Columbia, catalyzing mass protest by local whites and the circulating of a petition to Parliament that drew thousands of names. With help from a circle of American nativist agitators, an Asiatic Exclusion League formed in Vancouver. On September 7, 1907, the league sponsored a mass demonstration against Asian immigration. It quickly broke into a race riot. White thugs attacked the city's Chinese and Japanese neighborhoods, damaging property and looting shops until driven away by armed Japanese residents.[19] In the aftermath of the riot, federal opposition leader Robert Borden joined local leaders in defending the agitation. Borden asserted that British Columbia was and must remain "a White Man's province."

The riot and its aftermath forced the government of Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier to move. To placate Japan (as well as Great Britain), Laurier appointed a team headed by Deputy Minister of Labor—and future prime minister—W. L. Mackenzie King to tour the riot area and report on the amount of damages caused by the riot, which the federal government then awarded. (In a sign of the government's priorities, most of the funds were directed to fixing the Japanese consulate rather than to repairing damaged shops or houses). Meanwhile, hoping to calm the anger of the restrictionists without violating Japan's treaty rights, in December 1907 Laurier dispatched his labor minister, Rodolphe Lemieux, to Tokyo to negotiate a new agreement with Japan: the Lemieux mission represented the first-ever occasion on which Canadians bypassed London and undertook an independent foreign mission. The Japanese government refused to make any binding commitment, but Prime Minister Count Hayashi confidentially undertook to limit exit visa certificates to four hundred laborers (including domestics) per year: as in the United States, entry of merchants and ministers, as well as families of established immigrants, remained unrestricted. Although Lemieux was unable to make public any figures upon his return to Canada, he and Laurier assured his

colleagues in Parliament that the Japanese had agreed to limit immigration. The Hayashi-Lemieux "Gentleman's Agreement" was greeted with approval by the Liberal majority in Parliament. Hoping to create a united front against Japanese penetration, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt offered to send the American Pacific fleet to Victoria and Vancouver in early 1908. Laurier and his British colleagues were suspicious of this initiative, however, and politely declined.

THE ALIEN LAND ACTS

The Gentlemen's Agreements had a similar impact in both countries. In the years after they came into effect, many Japanese immigrants returned to Japan. Many of the Issei who remained decided to marry and raise families, since wives of established residents were permitted unrestricted entry under the agreements' provisions. As a result, tens of thousands of young women came from Japan to the United States and Canada in the following years as "picture brides," often joining husbands they knew only from photos and proxy marriages. Because of universal primary education in Japan, these women were generally quite literate—much more so than their white counterparts—and many of them had trained as teachers, virtually the only profession open to women in Japan. However, they were relegated by racial discrimination and dominant ideas about gender to working alongside their husbands as farmers and shopkeepers, as well as running households and caring for children. Since most of the Issei immigrants of both sexes were young adults of childbearing age, sons and daughters were born from their marriages at a rate that exceeded the average birthrate for the overall white population. As the new generation made its appearance, the ethnic Japanese population on the Pacific Coast became composed increasingly of young native-born citizens.

The anti-Japanese militants on the West Coast were not satisfied with the Gentlemen's Agreements and the cutoff of labor immigration. Rather, these policies only encouraged them to seek other curbs on the Issei. In Canada, the provincial assemblies of Saskatchewan and British Columbia passed laws forbidding the employment of white women in establishments owned by Asian men as a gesture against interracial relationships or indecency (parallel fears of "white slavery"—the abduction and prostitution of white women by Asians—in the United States led to the passage of the Mann Act, a pioneer federal criminal statute, in 1911). There also was

low-level agitation by white farmers to bar Asians from landownership or leaseholds. Local politicians in British Columbia and their representatives in Ottawa exerted pressure on the Conservative government of Robert Borden, elected in 1911, to halt all Japanese immigration, though without success. Still, the Canadian climate of hostility to Japanese or Chinese was soon overshadowed by the more powerful exclusionist campaign against East Indians. In 1908 immigrants from the subcontinent were effectively barred entry into Canada by a discriminatory regulation reserving entry only for those who made a "continuous voyage" directly from Asia. In accordance with this rule, in 1914 Gurdit Singh, a rich Sikh based in Hong Kong, chartered a Japanese ship, the *Komagata Maru*, to bring some 350 of his fellow Sikhs directly to Canada. When the ship reached Vancouver, however, local whites denied the crew permission to unload the passengers. They remained stranded aboard ship in the harbor for a month, before the crew was finally forced to weigh anchor and return with the passengers to Hong Kong.

In contrast, anti-Japanese sentiment remained a powerful political force in California, where agitation focused on landownership. In early 1909 the state legislature passed an Alien Land Act, which barred all "aliens ineligible to citizenship" (a transparent euphemism for Japanese and other Asians, who were barred from naturalization) from owning agricultural land. Although Japanese immigrant farmers owned only a tiny fraction of the state's acreage, economic competition from Japanese was a handy cause for political organizers and demagogues to take up. President Theodore Roosevelt feared a negative response from Tokyo since the measure would violate the spirit of the Gentleman's Agreement, and he thus prevailed successfully on Republican governor Hiram Johnson to veto the bill as a matter of national security. Two years later, the California legislature passed a similar bill, but President William Howard Taft again persuaded Johnson to veto it in the national interest.

In 1913 California's legislature once again took up a proposed Alien Land Act. The new president, Woodrow Wilson—a leader not celebrated for his attachment to equal rights for racial minorities—was sympathetic to the passage of such a law, provided it did not explicitly single out Japanese for discrimination. Wilson was unfamiliar with the diplomatic aspects of the situation, but when Japan registered strong protest, the president and his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, belatedly and ineffectually changed course. Bryan traveled to California in hopes of persuading Governor Johnson once more to veto the legislation.

However, Johnson was unwilling to take such an unpopular action at the behest of a Democratic administration, and he signed the bill into law in May 1913. Tokyo issued numerous diplomatic protests, raising fears of war, though it ultimately decided not to take more aggressive action.

The Alien Land Act forbade "aliens ineligible to citizenship" or corporations in which they held a majority interest from buying or owning agricultural land. As a result, Issei farmers were forced to put title to their holdings in the names of white friends or representatives, or to hold it in trust for their Nisei children, who were citizens. Some form of alien land legislation would be adopted in a dozen states over the decade that followed. Although the Alien Land Acts were unevenly enforced (there were numerous cases prosecuted under the act in Washington State, while in California only fourteen cases were bought under it in the thirty years after its enactment) and generally ineffective in their stated purpose of reducing control of land by Issei farmers, they sent a powerful message to Japanese Americans that they were unwanted.

THE POSTWAR ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT

The anti-Japanese movement in the United States and Canada slowed during the era of World War I, when Japan was allied with Great Britain and its possessions (and, after 1917, with the United States) against Germany, and there was powerful pressure for national unity on the home front. (Ironically, in view of future events, the same nationalistic fervor that reduced hostility toward Japanese Canadians led the Canadian government to intern as "enemy aliens" some 8,500 Ukrainian immigrants and their children as potential security risks).[20] By 1916, two years after Canada entered the war alongside Great Britain, the supply of Canadian volunteers had grown low. In British Columbia, some 200 Issei men formed a "Japanese Volunteer Corps," hoping to be absorbed into the Canadian Army as an all-Japanese unit. With financial support from local Japanese communities, they began military training. The government of British Columbia declined to support its Japanese recruits, while the army ruled they were too few to be enlisted as a separate unit and ordered them disbanded. However, a recruiter from Alberta invited the Canadian Japanese Association to send the volunteers to help fill his province's quota. By war's end, 202 ethnic Japanese had joined the Canadian Army and gone overseas for duty, of whom approximately three-fourths were killed

or wounded.[21] Once the United States entered the war, in April 1917, over a hundred soldiers and sailors of Japanese ancestry, many of whom were Nisei from Hawaii such as Joseph Kurihara and Ernest Wakayama, joined the U.S. Army and Navy. They served during the brief time that American troops were active in combat, before war ended with the armistice in November 1918.[22]

In the years after the armistice, when the prosperity that the war had brought farmers and businessmen sharply declined, anti-Japanese agitation resumed on the Pacific Coast with increased force and bitterness. California, as before, was a center of agitation. In 1920, following a voter initiative, California strengthened its alien land law and passed another measure (later overturned in court) preventing Japanese aliens from serving as guardians for land in the name of underage citizens. In 1921 the California legislature authorized local school districts to send Nisei children to segregated public schools, and Jim Crow education was established in communities such as Florin and Walnut Grove.

In parallel with the trend of discrimination, nativist groups such as the California Joint Immigration Committee (descendant of the Japanese Exclusion League) and the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West spearheaded propaganda campaigns for complete exclusion of Japanese immigrants. They charged that the Japanese had violated the Gentleman's Agreement by continuing to bring in picture brides, and they asserted (dubiously) that ethnic Japanese families were breeding at such an accelerated rate that the region would soon have a Japanese majority unless immigration was completely halted. Among the leading agitators were newspapermen such as William Randolph Hearst and Sacramento editor V. S. McClatchy. In countless speeches and writings, McClatchy alleged that all Japanese were primarily loyal to Japan. To obscure the birthright citizenship of the Nisei, McClatchy dismissed them as "dual citizens" who were considered Japanese subjects by the Japanese government. He added that the Japanese schools and community institutions were seats of subversion. These anti-Japanese campaigns continued into the World War II years and helped determine popular images of Issei and Nisei.

Fears of Japanese encroachment spread to Hawaii, where ethnic Japanese comprised some 40 percent of the population. Although the territory enjoyed a real (if exaggerated) reputation for intergroup harmony, racial lines hardened in the 1920s. In the wake of a mass strike by sugar plantation workers in 1920, the haole (white) portrayed the Japanese as scheming to dominate the islands through their control of labor and succeeded

in breaking the strike by dividing the Issei strikers from their Filipino allies. In the wake of the strike, the ruling "Big Five" plantation oligarchy took a more confrontational attitude toward Asian militancy and "subversion."[23] Encouraged by McClatchy, who visited Hawaii in 1922, the territorial government of Hawaii targeted Japanese schools with a set of laws, including licensing provisions and discriminatory taxes, designed to put the schools out of business. Conversely, in 1924 the territorial government segregated public schools by establishing "English standard" schools open only to children who passed an English proficiency test—a nearly impossible feat for children of plantation workers brought up speaking the creole dialect of Hawaiian pidgin.[24] Mixing economic self-interest with fear of foreign ways, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association ceased its support of Buddhist churches. The association covertly funded an Issei Congregational minister, Takie Okumura, who undertook an "Americanization" campaign, through which he encouraged Japanese Americans to Christianize, speak English, and assimilate to white American culture. Beginning in 1927, Okumura established a series of "new Americans conferences" designed, as he privately admitted, to recruit Nisei to take up plantation labor rather than seeking entry into professions.[25]

Issei activists on the West Coast also took steps to calm the fears of their opponents through an Americanization campaign. They staged patriotic festivals, pushed the use of English, and reformed Japanese school curricula and textbooks. Meanwhile, with help from a small circle of white allies, they struggled vainly to oppose the anti-Japanese canards by issuing their own positive propaganda. They pointed out that the reproduction rate of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast was similar to that of whites in their age group, and they noted that more Japanese immigrants left the country than arrived during those years. Hoping to combat the bugaboo of dual citizenship for the Nisei, Japanese American representatives and their allies pointed out that the Nisei's status as Japanese citizens was purely nominal and had no more significance than that of any other Americans who held foreign citizenship. Overseas Japanese communities also enlisted the aid of the Japanese government. In 1920 they successfully prevailed upon Tokyo to cease providing visas for picture brides. Four years later, in response to Issei lobbying, the Japanese government enacted a new nationality law, according to which Nisei children of overseas Japanese who failed to register their birth with the local consulate were not recognized as Japanese subjects, and the Nisei could renounce their

Japanese citizenship at any time (i.e., without having to first complete military service). As part of their plan for Americanization, Issei leaders urged the Nisei to take steps to "expatriate." However, the rate of renunciation of Japanese citizenship remained fairly low, partly because some Nisei identified with Japan or wished to enjoy the potential benefits of Japanese citizenship, but mostly because the renunciation process was too cumbersome, expensive, or time-consuming to be worth the trouble.[26]

The Issei also fought in court to preserve their rights. With support from Japanese associations, in 1915 Takeo Ozawa, a longtime U.S. resident who had been educated in California and was thoroughly Americanized, attempted to take out citizenship papers. Following a lengthy legal process, in 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Ozawa's petition for citizenship. The Court unanimously held that, as a member of the Japanese race, Ozawa was not Caucasian and thus could not be considered eligible for citizenship under the law. By upholding the existing barriers to naturalization against Japanese Americans, the Court's decision solidified laws against land ownership for all categories of Asians. (The Court formally upheld the constitutionality of alien land laws the following year, in *Terrace v. Thompson*). Although they were unsuccessful in securing their right to naturalization or fighting the Alien Land Acts, Issei activists did prevail against anti-Japanese school laws. Following a campaign led by Fred Markino, editor of the *Hawaii Hochi* newspaper, Japanese Americans in Hawaii challenged the registration and tax provisions, which were unanimously struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1927.[27]

Although the Gentlemen's Agreements had all but eliminated Japanese immigration, during the early 1920s West Coast interests campaigned for total exclusion of Japanese immigrants. It was carried along by a larger national campaign for immigration restriction. During those years, there was an enormous surge throughout the country of reactionary nativist and white supremacist thought, whose advocates defined Americanism to exclude many different ethnic and racial minorities. The Ku Klux Klan, a mythic southern white supremacy group of Reconstruction times, was reinvented in 1915 as a force against African Americans, foreigners, Jews, and Catholics, and by the early 1920s it claimed five million members nationwide. Anti-Semitism became more visible nationwide during these years, as elite universities instituted quotas on Jewish students. A wave of antiblack riots swept the country during the "Red Summer" of 1919. During this period there was a strong current of anxiety about immigrants,

whom old-stock white Americans connected to radicalism, foreign values, and moral breakdown. Two bestselling books by elite scholars, Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) and Lothrop Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy* (1920), provided intellectual justification for popular fears that mass immigration was overwhelming the nation's superior Nordic stock and weakening the national character. In response to nativist pressure, in 1921 Congress passed a law drastically limiting immigration and establishing a "national origins" quota that limited future entry by foreign nationals to 3 percent of the population of such nationals residing in the United States in 1910. The quota blatantly discriminated against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, who were predominantly recent arrivals.[28]

Japanese immigrants were not directly affected by the new law, as their immigration was already restricted by the Gentleman's Agreement. Nevertheless, in the postwar climate of xenophobia and uncertainty, Americans of many different backgrounds and political orientations throughout the United States became convinced that Japanese immigrants were not assimilable into the larger (white) population and that they posed a threat on that basis. Even such a liberal internationalist as Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote that the exclusion of Japanese immigrants and the laws that prevented them from owning property or becoming citizens were justified as a means of preventing intermarriage and protecting white racial purity.[29] In 1924 Congress passed a new Immigration Act. It further reduced immigration quotas from each nation, to 2 percent of the population of those nationals in the United States in 1890, before mass immigration began. Under the leadership of Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a provision excluding all "aliens ineligible to citizenship" was added to the 1924 law. This provision clearly singled out Japanese immigrants, as previous legislation had already eliminated all other Asian immigration (apart from that from the Philippines, which as an American colony enjoyed unlimited entry for its residents). The strong protests of Japanese ambassador Masanao Hanihara over the dangerous consequences of the proposed legislation, rather than working against it, were actually twisted into threats by the bill's proponents and used to help secure passage. Since Japanese immigration would in any case have been minimal under a national origins quota, the legislation served no actual purpose other than to express hostility toward Japanese Americans. Its passage caused considerable outrage in Japan and helped discredit liberal internationalism and catalyze aggressive nationalism in that country.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CANADA

Canada witnessed a parallel wave of anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1920s. Although the British Columbia government, as a result of various international factors, did not bar Japanese aliens from landownership, various other discriminatory practices were legion. Aside from the continuing denial of voting rights to citizens of Asian ancestry in British Columbia, the arena in which racial discrimination became most visible was that of fishing, where Japanese were more numerous than either whites or First Nations (native) peoples by the end of World War I. In 1919 the Department of Fisheries in British Columbia responded to protests by white fishermen over Japanese competition by freezing the number of licenses issued to Japanese for gill-net fishing. Three years later the department appointed the Duff Commission to investigate industry conditions. White fishermen took the opportunity of committee hearings to complain at length about illegal and unfair practices by their Japanese counterparts, which they alleged (with considerable exaggeration) were driving them out of the business. As a result, the commission recommended that the number of licenses awarded Issei fishermen be cut. In the end, the number of licensed Issei fishermen fell by 1923 by 40 percent, to 1,200, and further reductions followed. Capitalizing on their victory, white fishermen launched a campaign to lobby Parliament for further limits. In 1926 the House of Commons' Standing Commission on Fisheries (a committee dominated by British Columbia MPs representing an all-white electorate) ordered a ban on new licenses to ethnic Japanese fishermen and proposed that the number of existing licenses for ethnic Japanese be cut by 10 percent each year until 1937, when the Issei were to be completely excluded. The Amalgamated Association of Japanese Fishermen challenged this policy in court, and in 1928 the Supreme Court of Canada overturned the exclusion policy. However, the federal government immediately issued orders-in-council that maintained the freeze on licenses and left some 1,300 Issei fishermen unemployed.[30]

Similarly, West Coast lobbyists, headed by the Vancouver Asiatic Exclusion League, exerted considerable pressure for exclusion of Japanese immigrants from Canada. A popular novel, Hilda Glynn-Ward's *The Writing on the Wall* (1921), painted a lurid picture of Chinese and Japanese economic penetration of British Columbia and the impoverishment of the white population. The novel ended by describing a Chinese economic takeover of the province, followed by a Japanese military invasion.

While the work was extreme in its views, and it is unclear how directly influential it was, it was not without echoes in popular attitudes about the "unassimilable" nature of Asian immigrants and the menace of intermarriage.[31] (A Japanese government ban in 1925 on visas for picture brides to Canada, mirroring that for the United States five years earlier, did nothing to halt hateful propaganda over the high "Japanese" birth rate in British Columbia).

British Columbia politicians such as H. H. Stevens and W. G. McQuarrie led the campaign in Parliament for a nationwide ban on Asian immigration. In 1923 Canada passed a Chinese immigration act that barred virtually all Chinese immigration. Shortly thereafter, an Independent MP from British Columbia, A.W. Neill, introduced a bill to extend the exclusion to Japanese. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, who declared himself in favor of a culturally homogenous, "White" Canada, preferred to avoid unilateral action. Instead, he held a series of negotiations with the Japanese consul general, using the threat of legislation as a lever to tighten immigration. Under the pressure, the Japanese government agreed in August 1923 to cut the annual number of immigrant laborers admitted under the Gentleman's Agreement.[32]

Encouraged by the American exclusion law of 1924, members of Parliament from British Columbia continued to push for a total federal ban on Japanese immigration, and in 1927 even introduced provisions for repatriation of existing immigrants. However, Japan had become Canada's third largest trading partner, and fears of Japanese retaliation and damage to economic relations blunted pressure for harsher measures. After considerable diplomatic wrangling off and on over several years, in 1929 Japan reluctantly agreed to reduce its total immigration quota under the Gentleman's Agreement to 150 persons per year. To ease Canadian anxiety over the Japanese birthrate, Tokyo further pledged that not more than half of those immigrants permitted would be women. In return, Canada (which shortly before had won from Great Britain the right to its own diplomatic representatives) agreed to establish official ties with Japan.[33]

THE NISEI GENERATION

The end of immigration to North America brought about a significant change in policy by the Japanese government. In response largely to domestic protests within Japan, Tokyo exerted a low-level campaign to influence the Americans to alter the Japanese Exclusion Act and grant Japan an immigration quota, a movement strenuously opposed by V. S. McClatchy and other nativists.[34] However, government officials preferred to shift their attention to encouraging immigration elsewhere. Throughout the early twentieth century, waves of laborers had migrated to Mexico and to South America (often as contract laborers) and provided the workforce for plantations in countries such as Peru and Bolivia. Ultimately, many laborers left the plantations after their contracts expired and migrated to urban areas. After the United States and Canada closed their doors, emigration agents focused their efforts on encouraging workers to settle in Brazil, and over 100,000 Japanese emigrated there in the ten years that followed. However, during the 1930s, in a time of worldwide economic depression, nationalist pressures developed in Brazil and in other countries, to which governments responded by limiting or banning Japanese immigration and reducing the liberties of existing residents.[35]

Meanwhile, Japanese communities in North America shifted their orientation from struggling for the rights of the immigrants to focusing on building for their Nisei children. As citizens by birth in the United States and Canada, the Nisei could not be subjected to legal discrimination as aliens, and the older generation hoped that they would serve as a bridge between their ancestral homeland and their native country. Japanese newspapers in the United States, beginning with the *San Francisco Nichi Bei* and the *Rafu Shimpo* in Los Angeles, began featuring English sections edited by Nisei. Churches and temples planned activities for young people, social clubs and sports leagues grew up, and communities established festivals—in Los Angeles's Little Tokyo, the traditional ceremony of O-Bon was transformed into "Nisei Day."[36] In Canada, where Nisei long remained a minority of the Japanese community and were restricted in their legal rights, Issei leaders followed the same strategy on a smaller scale.[37] A particular focus of community pride in Vancouver's Powell Street, the largest Canadian Japantown, during the interwar years was a Nisei baseball team, the Asahis, who won the Pacific Northwest baseball championship for five straight years from 1937 to 1941.[38]

Yet community leaders acted ambivalently in planning their and their children's future. Many Issei leaders continued to believe in the promise of their adopted nations and urged the Nisei to be good citizens. Others, noting the pervasive discrimination that ethnic Japanese faced in the United States and Canada, sought closer ties with Japan and looked ahead to an eventual return. Parents sought to assure that their Americanized

children would be familiar with Japanese language and customs. That way, they could not only adapt in case the families should choose to repatriate but could find jobs with Japanese companies where their advancement would not be blocked by racial prejudice. To teach the second-generation children Japanese and to allow them to communicate more easily with parents who spoke poor English, the Issei communities expended significant community funds on maintaining Japanese schools for their children to attend. The curricula of these schools included Japanese history and moral education.[39] However, between the poor instruction they offered, the often authoritarian Japanese teachers they featured, and the fact that classes were held in the afternoon after regular school, thereby preempting play time, the Japanese schools were widely detested among the young Nisei, many of whom failed to attain fluency in Japanese. In contrast, a large fraction of (predominantly male) Nisei—as much as one-fourth of the entire population—were sent back to Japan for some or all of their schooling during the prewar years. Many of these Nisei, known as "Kibei"(and among Canadians as "Kika"), had great difficulty, at least at first, fitting in with their Japanese classmates, who were suspicious of and hostile to the "Americans" as foreigners.[40] While many Issei, perhaps most, felt an emotional attachment to their birthplace, the attitude of the Nisei toward Japan was more fluid and diverse, and harder to determine. Most Nisei were shaped to a degree by their Japanese background and absorbed a certain outlook from their parents. They regularly ate Japanese food, learned Japanese folk songs and dances, performed translations of Japanese plays, and cheered Japanese athletes in international competitions. A small but indeterminate number—particularly those Kibei who had remained for long periods in Japan and were somewhat isolated within Nisei circles by lack of English fluency—identified themselves fully as Japanese. Nevertheless, the vast majority of Nisei acculturated to American norms and identified themselves entirely as Americans.

In addition to legal inequality, Nisei on the Pacific Coast of both countries faced widespread exclusion in daily life. Minoru Yamasaki, a Seattle youth who would become a distinguished architect, later stated his opinion that the prejudice he experienced growing up on the West Coast was as powerful as that facing blacks in the South.[41] Although the Nisei were outstanding in their educational achievement—West Coast Japanese Americans attended college in disproportionate numbers during the prewar years—they faced restrictive quotas in many local colleges and professional schools. Furthermore, they were largely excluded by custom

from white-collar jobs and denied entry into the civil service.[42] In British Columbia (where bars on suffrage rights for Nisei also meant they were formally excluded from practicing law and some fields of engineering), only a single Nisei teacher was hired to teach in the province's public schools, and that in a virtually all-Japanese school. Another university graduate in Victoria was unable to find employment except as a domestic.[43] As a result, Nisei were relegated to working for family stores and businesses or for local Issei merchants. Trained engineers and teachers were forced to take jobs farming or selling fruit. A number of outstanding Nisei, discouraged by limited career prospects, took jobs working for branches of Japanese firms. Sociologist T. Scott Miyakawa worked for the Manchurian Railway, while attorney Minoru Yasui was hired by the Japanese consulate in Chicago, and journalist Larry Tajiri was employed as a correspondent by the Tokyo *Asahi* in New York. A fraction of Nisei left North America entirely and settled in Japan, where they found jobs in business or in the entertainment industry—an article written in 1939 estimated that five thousand Nisei lived in Tokyo. Another set of Nisei, which included journalists Bill Hosokawa and John Fujii of the *Japanese American Courier* and Shinobu Higashi, first editor of the *New Canadian*, accepted jobs under the Japanese occupation in Asian territories such as Manchuria and Shanghai.

In Hawaii, with its Asian majority population, overt racial prejudice was rare, but class and dialect barriers limited advancement for Nisei outside of a small elite group: despite their academic success in public schools, Nisei remained underrepresented at the University of Hawaii. There were also episodes of prejudice. In 1939 Tatsue Fujita, a Nisei woman graduate of Hawaii Teacher's College, was arbitrarily denied a teaching license on the grounds of her allegedly "undemocratic" and "pro-Japanese" attitudes.[44]

Although the majority of the native-born were under eighteen throughout the prewar years, a group of young adult Nisei established a set of fledgling organizations to defend the interests of the new generation, notably the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), founded in 1930, and its northern counterpart the Japanese Canadian Citizens League (JCCL), created in 1936. In addition, a handful of U.S. Nisei established their own journals, beginning with James Sakamoto's *Japanese American Courier* in 1928, while a circle of activists in British Columbia banded together in 1938 to found the *New Canadian*, which became the voice of Canadian Nisei. These journalists and community leaders

stressed love of country, and pushed participation in patriotic festivals such as "I Am an American" Day. At the same time, they lobbied for equal citizenship rights. The JACL lobbied successfully to repeal the Cable Act, which stripped American-born women of citizenship if they married Asian aliens, and to eliminate school segregation.[45] Still, in part because of the relatively small proportion of Nisei who were of voting age, political participation was not extremely marked in West Coast communities. The Nisei leadership was largely Republican and probusiness, although the Nisei Young Democrat clubs that formed in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland in 1938–1939 proved to be centers of activism.[46] There was little or no Nisei electoral activity apart from the campaign of Clarence Arai, an attorney and JACL founder who ran unsuccessfully for the Washington State Legislature on the Republican ticket in 1933.[47] In Hawaii, by contrast, where the average age of Nisei was higher and patterns of political participation were more established, local Japanese became politically active in both parties. By 1936 there were nine Nisei representatives in the territorial legislature, plus Japanese American political appointees and civil servants. There was a Nisei delegate from Hawaii at that year's Democratic National Convention. In November 1940 Sanji Abe, a World War I veteran, became the first Nisei member of the territorial Senate. As was demonstrated in a series of congressional hearings on statehood beginning in 1935, the voting power of Japanese Americans in Hawaii, and their potential as candidates for public office, weighed powerfully against statehood for the territory during the prewar era, especially among the southern Democratic representatives and senators who dominated congressional committees during those years.

The Canadian Nisei who came of age in the 1930s focused their attention on winning voting rights in British Columbia, where the vast majority of the Japanese population lived. With aid from the Camp and Mill Workers Union, a labor organization staffed by progressive Issei (and also from a few white allies, such as liberal professor Henry F. Angus), the Canadian Nisei lobbied for suffrage. Although in 1931 the British Columbia legislature finally approved, by a single-vote margin, voting rights for Great War veterans of Asian ancestry, neither major party's leaders were prepared to consider enfranchising ordinary citizens in the face of widespread popular opposition: white nativists charged that granting suffrage would lead to demands for further immigration and to Asian rule of the province.[48] Not even the legislators from the provincial wing of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a Social Democratic Party founded in 1933, dared support Asian suffrage. The Liberal Party nonetheless issued a blatant racist attack on the CCF during the 1935 federal elections, informing voters that a vote for the CCF would give "the Chinaman and the Japanese the same voting right as you have."[49]

Hoping to go over the heads of the British Columbians, in 1936 the JCCL sent a delegation of Nisei, led by the distinguished Canadian-born semanticist Dr. S. I. Hayakawa, to Ottawa for testimony before a parliamentary committee on behalf of a national law granting suffrage to citizens of Japanese ancestry.[50] The national CCF announced its support, and various Liberals outside of British Columbia favored passage. However, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, who disingenuously claimed that he had not been aware that the Japanese Canadians wished suffrage rights, opposed the measure out of political expediency. Thomas Reid, a British Columbia MP, publicly asserted that the entire bid for suffrage was part of an attempt by Japan to place its spies in British Columbia.[51] In the end, Parliament decided not to grant suffrage to Asian Canadians until British Columbia did so—already an unlikely event in 1936, and less so as conflict loomed with Japan.

THE CRISIS OF U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS

During the 1930s, events in Asia led to increasing strains between Japan and the United States, breeding suspicion over Japanese motives that rebounded against Japanese Americans. Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States had remained fairly placid during the 1920s. The two countries, along with Great Britain, were major signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922. The treaty reaffirmed the "open door" policy in China, dissolved the Anglo-Japanese naval alliance, and reduced the number of capital ships in each country's navy to a fixed ratio (Japan, because it theoretically only had one ocean to patrol, accepted a ratio of three ships to five ships for the British or American navies). In exchange, the United States agreed not to further fortify its Pacific possessions of Guam and the Philippines. However, following the onset of the Great Depression, economic and demographic pressure within Japan, mixed with nationalist anger over slights such as the 1924 Immigration Act, had catalyzed a shift toward militarism and imperialism in Tokyo's policy. When Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi agreed to extend the limitations of the Washington Naval Treaty, denounced by Japanese nationalists as unfair,

he was assassinated in 1931. Soon after, the Japanese Army staged an incident in Chinese province of Manchuria, which it used as a pretext for launching an invasion and occupation of the province. The Japanese government, which lacked the power to countermand the military's popular action, instead absorbed Manchuria, establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo.

The United States, which considered itself the unofficial patron of China, reacted with hostility to the Japanese action in Manchuria. However, President Herbert Hoover, embroiled in facing the Great Depression, was unwilling to oppose the occupation by means of economic sanctions or military action that might lead to war. Instead, Secretary of State Henry Stimson outlined a policy of nonrecognition of Manchukuo, a legalistic solution that alienated the Japanese without applying effective pressure against them. In the fall of 1932, a new president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was elected. Roosevelt chose to continue the "Stimson doctrine." During the balance of the 1930s, FDR experimented with various means of subtle pressure, including moral suasion, opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and naval rearmament, to prod Tokyo to abandon its aggressive policy in Asia without either risking war or harming America's lucrative trade with Japan. The pressure failed to accomplish its objective. In 1936 Japan rejected existing naval arms limitations as unequal and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, associating itself with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union.

Canada, with a proportionately higher trade with Japan, was even more circumspect in facing off against Tokyo. As noted, Japan was one of the first areas of the Dominion's diplomacy, and Canadians were loath to surrender their position. Although Canada's right to an independent foreign policy was formally recognized by Great Britain under the Statute of Westminster in 1931, Ottawa had little interest in diplomatic initiatives in Asia, especially in the absence of British or American leadership. Further, unlike the mandarins of the U.S. State Department, many Canadian diplomats in the early 1930s disdained China and sympathized with Japanese claims in Manchuria, which they saw as stemming anarchy. In December 1932 C. H. Cahan, Canada's representative at the League of Nations, made a speech in Geneva against sanctions that was so extreme in its pro-Japanese view as to stir fears of a Chinese boycott of Canada. Although the Conservative government of Prime Minister R. B. Bennett nominally disclaimed Cahan and supported the report of the Lytton Commission deploring the Japanese invasion, Canada opposed collective action for sanctions against Tokyo.[52] When the Liberals returned to power in 1935, Prime Minister Mackenzie King promised to pursue an international policy that would satisfy Canadians throughout the country and promote national unity. In practice, this meant appealing to isolationists and French Canadians by distancing Canada from Great Britain and the League of Nations and pursuing a policy of isolationism, except in those few areas where Canada had a direct interest. King neglected the Canadian Army and was embarrassed when President Roosevelt, on a trip to British Columbia in mid-1937, expressed shocked dismay over the poor state of Canada's Pacific defenses.[53]

THE JAPANESE INVASION OF CHINA

In 1937 the Japanese military launched a full-scale invasion of China and within months succeeded in pushing the weak Nationalist government away from the densely populated Pacific coast. News of Japanese atrocities stunned the world—notably the bombing of Shanghai and the "Rape of Nanking," in which the Japanese soldiers taking China's capital slaughtered at least 100,000 civilians and possibly many times that figure. American public opinion, already largely sympathetic to China, was further aroused in December 1937 when Japanese airplanes bombed and sank an American gunboat, the *Panay*, anchored in China, although the Japanese government quickly offered an official apology and compensation. Private groups campaigned for a boycott of Japanese goods, and Chinese American groups and their white allies raised large sums for Chinese war relief.

The Roosevelt administration was limited in the scope of its possible actions on the international front by a set of neutrality laws enacted by Congress during the mid-1930s in response to events in Europe, but the White House refused to invoke neutrality in the Far East and offered limited economic aid to the Chinese government in its struggle against the Japanese occupation. In October 1937 the president, with Japan in mind, publicly proposed international action to "quarantine the aggressors," though he denied that economic sanctions were the goal of the policy. However, Roosevelt and his advisors did not wish to become entangled in any military conflict, even as war drew near in Europe, and the United States continued to sell strategic materials such as gasoline and steel to Japan. Roosevelt chose not to take more provocative action over the two

years that followed, until the outbreak of war in Europe inspired a reexamination of American policy. Canada, similarly, offered verbal condemnation of the Japanese occupation of China, as Canadian public opinion swung decisively toward the Chinese—Norman Bethune did much to popularize their cause through a humanitarian medical mission to China, while his subsequent death made him a national martyr. A popular movement arose for the boycott of Japanese goods. However, Ottawa saw no cause for decisive steps such as sanctions or boycotts, especially in the absence of clear action by the United States.[54]

OFFICIAL SURVEILLANCE OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IN HAWAII

As relations with Japan worsened during the 1930s, U.S. government and army officials grew increasingly anxious about potential disloyalty by both Issei and Nisei, especially in the territory of Hawaii, where residents of Japanese ancestry represented the largest single population group. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, military planners drew up plans for defending Hawaii against a potential Japanese invasion. They assumed that in case of war, Japanese Americans irrespective of background or citizenship would side with the enemy. As early as the 1920s, the army's War Plans Division organized a defense plan for Hawaii (assembled by Col. John DeWitt, who would later order mass removal of Japanese Americans as Western Defense commander) containing provisions for martial law in the territory, registration of Japanese aliens, and selective internment of those thought dangerous. Similarly, in 1933 the Hawaiian branch of G-2 (Army Intelligence) issued a report on the "Japanese problem" in the islands. It characterized both first- and second-generation Japanese Americans as marked by traits of "fanaticism" and racial and "moral inferiority." It also stated that, according to local whites, the increase in the local Japanese population represented a danger to the safety of the islands since the vast majority of Japanese Americans, whether citizen or alien, could be expected to side with Japan in the event of an invasion and to commit sabotage in order to prevent effective response.[55]

In 1935 Hawaii's commanding general Hugh Drum (who as wartime Eastern Defense commander would later push unsuccessfully for mass action against German and Italian aliens) publicly called for martial law in the territory if war broke out. When a subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee visited Hawaii, Drum justified his position

to committee members by reference to the peril of racial diversity: "It is the experience of all nations, including the United States, that mixtures of widely dissimilar racial elements constitute a serious problem in time of emergency. History . . . shows that during an emergency armed forces are often necessary to protect loyal citizens as against disaffected and rebellious ones."[56]

In May 1936 Secretary of War George Dern submitted to President Roosevelt a report by a military Joint Planning Committee that detailed some problems in the defense of Hawaii. The report noted that Japanese naval personnel traveling on Japanese commercial ships routinely stopped in Hawaii, where they delivered mail to the locals from their relatives in Japan and otherwise mixed with local Japanese in restaurants, temples, and teahouses to spread Japanese propaganda and encourage subversion. The president responded on August 10, 1936, that the committee should make contingency plans to deal with the local Japanese population throughout Hawaii in case of conflict with Japan: "One obvious thought occurs to me—that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these ships or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble."[57]

Although Roosevelt was clearly thinking in terms of controlling dangerous individuals in a military emergency, his use of the term "concentration camp" and his failure to distinguish between Japanese aliens and American citizens shows that he shared the race-based assumptions that other government officials were making about Japanese Americans and their loyalty. In the months that followed, FDR called for the formation of an interagency committee to develop strategies for curbing Japanese espionage in Hawaii, and he approved measures limiting employment on naval bases in the territory to Caucasians.[58] When Honolulu industrialist Walter Dillingham, a reserve officer, visited the White House in early 1938, Roosevelt asked him "numerous pointed questions" that underlined his doubts regarding the loyalties and sympathies of Japanese Americans.[59]

THE SALICH TRIAL

The government's fears of disloyalty and efforts to control Japanese Americans were not confined to Hawaii. A drumbeat of sensational accu-

sations from both official and unofficial sources raised suspicions about the loyalty of West Coast communities. In 1934 a U.S. State Department memorandum warned that, in case of war between the United States and Japan, "the entire Japanese population" on the West Coast would rise in support of Tokyo.[60] The same year, Lail T. Kane, an officer of the American Legion, aired what would become a familiar canard when he told a House committee that Issei fishing boats could be easily transformed, once in international waters outside the three-mile limit, into torpedo boats for the Japanese Navy. Meanwhile, U.S. Representative John Dockweiler made the absurd announcement that one-fourth of Japanese Americans in California were Japanese Army reserve officers ready to take up arms at a moment's notice.[61] In 1937 the War Department submitted a report on "Japanese activities" in "lower California and Mexico" that claimed (with dubious accuracy) that there had been visits by Japanese naval forces. Popular hysteria went even further. In 1935–36, widespread stories spread about a Japanese fishing fleet of 120 boats operating out of California harbors using ships constructed in Japan, which could be transformed immediately into mine layers, manned by 2,000 trained Japanese naval officers disguised as fishermen. Journalist Carey McWilliams investigated the charges and found that of all the active fishing boats over 115 feet, only two were Japanese-owned, and only ten more were in the 85–110 foot range. There were only 680 licensed Japanese fishermen in California out of a total of 5,399.[62]

In conjunction with the increased government concern over security, the Office of Naval Intelligence was assigned to keep tabs on West Coast Japanese Americans during the late 1930s. The extent of ONI surveillance was publicly revealed by the case of Hafis Salich. Salich, a Russian-born former Berkeley, California, police officer, was hired in August 1936 by the U.S. Naval Intelligence Bureau for the 11th District (Southern California, Arizona, and New Mexico) as a civilian employee. Sent to spy on Japanese activities in Los Angeles, he arrived in Little Tokyo and posed as a friend of the Nisei. According to later testimony, his tasks included "detailing the coming and going on the west coast of Japanese military and civil officials as well as private citizens whose actions were deemed of possible interest to the Intelligence Office."[63] Salich took notes on movements of Nisei-owned fishing boats at Terminal Island and their actions in Mexican waters.[64] Salich was approached by a Soviet agent, Mikhail Gorin, who offered him money in exchange for information. Gorin persuaded him that Japan was the common enemy of the United States and

the Soviet Union, so it would be of mutual benefit to share intelligence. Salich ultimately provided a set of over fifty reports that he and others had compiled for the San Pedro branch of ONI.

Arrested by the FBI, Salich and Gorin were brought to trial in January 1939 and ultimately convicted under the Espionage Act. (Gorin's wife, Natasha, was also indicted but was acquitted by the jury).[65] At trial, selections from the reports were introduced into evidence. The information they contained described not only the movements and activities of suspected agents sent by Japan, but the activities and attitudes of Issei and Nisei community members. One report cited a *Rafu Shimpo* columnist as writing articles in "pro-Japanese and anti-American" fashion.[66] Another reported the interrogation of a Nisei woman who had a "suspicious" meeting with a white American sailor.[67] A third listed names and reported activities of several ethnic Japanese whom it described without elaboration as "suspected of being interested in intelligence work."[68] One dispatch, with unintentional irony, recounted keeping tabs on the loyalty of a Nisei dentist who was an officer in the U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR), in case his race-based exclusion caused him to be discontented. "After completion of his sea duty, he was attached to aviation unit of USNR, but because of his Japanese descent, it is evident, he is not being encouraged to consider his career with USNR."[69] A few reports discussed activities of the local JACL and an allied Nisei organization, the Far East Research Institute. The JACL was described, in somewhat melodramatic fashion, as rent by conflict between those who thought it should be primarily a social organization and those who favored civic action.

Taken together, the documents and the testimony surrounding them revealed massive official distrust of Issei and Nisei, even those engaged in harmless activities. The names of many ordinary Japanese Americans appeared on surveillance lists, although Salich himself insisted at trial that he had no idea whether any of the people he reported on were actually espionage agents. Their names were lumped together indiscriminately alongside those of imperial navy officers as "Japanese." The JACL was likewise infiltrated, despite the lack of evidence of disloyal activity.

Furthermore, while Salich described himself as believing in the loyalty of the Nisei, he characterized the Issei as "intensely patriotic to their emperor."[70] Gorin, by contrast, was quoted as saying that, like his Russian superiors, he trusted neither group: "He thought that the Japanese that were born here or in Japan were all pro-Japanese and that Americans were laboring under a delusion [in thinking] that the Japanese could

be trusted . . . second generation or not."[71] Reports by other agents suggested that the more extreme view was widely held. One dispatch asserted that the Issei were ardently pro-Japan and were successful in influencing the Nisei to support Tokyo. "The Nisei, during grammar school and high school seem to like their surroundings and are contented to be with the Americans in this country. However, on entering college there is a gradual shift towards the issei ideas and quite a few definitely shift to a strong allegiance towards Japan."[72] A Nisei reporter observing the trial summarized the attitude of government officials uncovered by the trial: "Through cross-examination and detailed testimony it was revealed that the official Russian and American opinion is that Nisei are Japanese and, consequently, potentially dangerous."[73]

AMBIVALENCE AND SUPPORT FOR JAPAN

How much were these reports and estimates guided by reality, and how much by prejudice? On the one hand, there was certainly evidence supporting the case for concern over espionage by Japan. Japanese naval officials regularly visited Little Tokyo communities, which became havens for Japanese agents who were smuggled into the United States as language students. In 1936 an Imperial Navy commander, Toshio Miyazaki, was set up as an exchange student at Stanford University. Miyazaki recruited a white navy yeoman, Harry Thompson, who provided him with naval plans and documents. Thompson and John Farnsworth, a former naval officer, were subsequently convicted of espionage.[74] In the mid-1930s Itaru Tachibana, a Japanese Navy lieutenant commander, came to the United States as a language student. Tachibana constructed an espionage network in Southern California that was exposed in early 1941, with Tachibana being expelled from the country. One of those arrested was Toraichi Kono, a former valet to actor Charlie Chaplin, although he was not charged and was subsequently released.

Government officials and Naval Intelligence officers were also well aware that Tokyo engaged in infiltration of spies through its consulates. Takeo Yoshikawa, a Japanese agent who later confessed to providing the Japanese government with key photographs and information on the defenses at Pearl Harbor, was brought to Hawaii in 1937 as a consular official.[75] Richard Kotoshirodo, a Kibei who was employed by the Japanese consulate in Hawaii, later confessed to being duped by Japanese employees into assisting in gathering of information on American bases during 1941, activities that he was assured were not illegal. (It was clear to government investigators that Kotshirodo had no treasonable intent and was unaware of the seriousness of his actions, and they thus declined, even amid wartime conditions, to prosecute him.)[76]

Fears of Japanese espionage were lent additional plausibility by the close ties that the overseas Japanese communities, both in Hawaii and on the West Coast, maintained with Japan and its government during the 1930s. Japanese consulates remained important centers of community activity and economic life. Japanese-language newspapers featured news from Tokyo, of which a significant proportion came from official news agencies and the censored Japanese press. Visits by members of the imperial family attracted enthusiastic crowds, as did semiofficial publicity tours by Japanese movie stars and athletes. Businessmen and government leaders in Japan made particular efforts to build connections to the Issei and Nisei. Tokyo awarded medals to outstanding Issei, such as the Sacramento agriculturist and "Potato King" George Shima, and provided numerous scholarships and offered propaganda tours of Japan for Japanese Americans (as well as others). Also, beginning in the 1910s if not earlier, Tokyo employed Issei literati as propagandists, and their careers flourished under Japan's continued patronage.[77] Stanford professor Yamato Ichihashi, one of the first Asian American professors on the West Coast, occupied a chair that was secretly funded by the Japanese government. During the 1930s Ichihashi, who had previously served as a representative of Japan in international meetings, undertook a vigorous speech and letter campaign justifying the military's actions in China.[78] Similarly, writer/journalist Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, who was employed by the official Domei news agency, was commissioned by the Foreign Ministry during the 1930s to lecture and draft newspaper articles in support of Japanese policy. Presumably with imperial government assistance, Kawakami published a set of books in English and in French lauding Japan's control of Manchuria and China. Japanese officials also used newspapers to spread their message. The New York-based *Japanese American Review*, an English-language newspaper founded in January 1939, regularly celebrated the glories of Japanese foreign policy and the achievements of Manchukuo. In any case, Japanese-owned businesses and their American subsidiaries took much of the advertising that financed the vernacular press.

Japanese efforts to woo the overseas communities reaped important dividends. For the balance of the 1930s, North American Japanese either

supported Japan's military regime or remained silent. Masses of Japanese Americans cheered the invasion of China in 1937. In Los Angeles, local leaders raised a subscription to donate an airplane to the Japanese military for its fight.[79] Language-school students in Hawaii put together food packages to send to Japanese soldiers in Manchuria.[80] More frequently, West Coast Japanese American communities raised funds for Japanese war relief, a less controversial and more equivocal means of support. For example, a group of Nisei in Salt Lake City, led by Mike Masaoka, formed a Nisei Sincerity Society, which set as a goal the raising of a dollar from each Nisei of high school age or older to be sent to the Japanese Red Cross.[81] Antifascist writer/activist Ayako Ishigaki (Haru Matsui), a columnist for the *Rafu Shimpo*, deplored the widespread enthusiasm in Little Tokyo for Japan's war machine, which she attributed to the wounded pride of Japanese Americans isolated by prejudice.[82] (She might have also added the impact of endemic anti-Chinese prejudice among the Issei, some of which the Nisei absorbed.) There were some who had more pragmatic reasons for supporting the Japanese position. The calls for embargoes of Japanese goods by Chinese groups and their allies targeted overseas Japanese merchants and included boycotts of locally produced goods. The Issei merchant organizations, such as the Vancouver Jinkyoku Iinkai (Emergency Committee), that sprung up to combat the boycotts were thus fighting for their livelihoods, and not just over matters of international policy.[83]

Whether out of principle or opportunism, many West Coast Issei and Nisei journalists and community figures publicly defended the Japanese cause. In 1937 Editor Sei Fujii of *Kashu Mainichi*, an Issei, categorically denied stories of Japanese atrocities in Nanking and praised the "kindly . . . and friendly manner" in which all Japanese soldiers treated the Chinese.[84] At the same time, Togo Tanaka, Nisei editor of the *Rafu Shimpo*'s English section, called on the United States to recognize Manchukuo and blamed the Sino-Japanese War on Chinese provocation of a peace-loving Japan. A number of young Japanese Americans, notably Professor Kazuo Kawai of UCLA (who was born in Japan but was raised from boyhood in the United States and considered himself a Nisei) took the Japanese side in public debates with Chinese Americans and others. Reporter Kazumaro "Buddy" Uno, who traveled to China in 1937 and 1938 to cover the war, offered a series of pro-Japan lectures, sponsored by local chapters of the JACL, upon his return. As late as February 1940, Nisei columnist Tad Uyeno blamed the war on aggression by a pro-Communist Chinese government and praised Japan's "policy of peace in the Orient."[85] Seattle Nisei lawyer Kenji Ito, whose practice depended on business he obtained through the local Japanese consulate, was so vociferous in his speeches defending Japan at the end of the 1930s that after Pearl Harbor the U.S. government would prosecute him unsuccessfully as a suspected Japanese agent.[86] Indeed, so powerful was the trend of support and the community sanctions against dissent that antifascist intellectuals such as Larry Tajiri, English editor of the San Francisco *Nichi Bei*, rather than openly opposing Japan's policy in the vernacular press, counseled the Nisei to remain neutral and distance themselves from the Far East question.

The public position taken by Japanese American and Canadian communities on Japanese militarism must have encouraged intelligence agencies and government officials in North America to suspect their loyalty and to investigate their actions.[87] All this said, it is essential not to lose sight of the fact that these expressions occurred against a background of continuing and unstinting community fidelity to the United States and Canada. In particular, it was perfectly legal for Americans of all sorts to favor Japan over China during the 1930s, a time of peace between Japan and the United States, and many did so without compromising their allegiance to America, a notable example being African American activist W.E.B. DuBois. (Ironically, many of those who supported China against Japan during that period were later termed "premature antifascists" and investigated for Communist sympathies.) The support offered by Japanese North American communities for the Imperial Army's occupation of China during 1937–1940 certainly did not mean that they would assist the Japanese military against their own countries. In contrast, the vast majority, particularly Nisei, fiercely proclaimed their Americanism. As we shall see, they would grow increasingly vociferous as war loomed between the United States and Japan.

WAR IN EUROPE AND THE JAPANESE CANADIANS

Although Canada did not intervene officially against the Japanese occupation of China, public opposition to Tokyo and growing fears of global conflict became prominent parts of the Canadian political landscape. These served as a boon to racist groups such as the Native Sons and Daughters of British Columbia, who drew a parallel between Japanese militarism and the domestic threat, and to the opportunistic politi-

cians who sought their support. Thomas Reid, MP for New Westminster, argued in the magazine *Saturday Night* in July 1937 that the twenty-two thousand Japanese Canadians were a menace to national security. Because of their high birthrate, Japanese Canadians were encroaching on the economic and political centers of power, but their racial inassimilability and their attachment to the Japanese emperor made them incapable of supporting Canada. Liberal Premier T. D. "Duff" Pattullo of British Columbia, responding to Conservative charges that illegal immigration of Japanese was causing a rise in the Japanese population of the province, wrote to Prime Minster King to propose that a commission be appointed to study the question and offered his personal recommendation that Japanese immigration be completely banned.[88] An investigatory committee soon found the charges of illicit entry to be baseless and blamed nativist forces for spreading stories of smuggling rings: "Unfortunately the situation in British Columbia is complicated by the circulation of rumours which have little proven substance but which are disseminated assiduously as records of fact."[89] On the basis of the report, King held firm against abolishing the remnant of the Gentleman's Agreement, but agitation continued. An outstanding demagogue, Vancouver City Council alderman Halford Wilson, called for the abolition of Japanese schools as a menace to state security and campaigned unsuccessfully to block commercial licenses for Japanese-owned shops in the city.

In September 1939 Germany invaded Poland and World War II began in Europe. As a sign of its independence, Canada waited one week after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany before following suit with its own declaration of war on September 10. The inevitability of Canadian involvement, however, was demonstrated by the declaration by Parliament on September 1 that the War Measures Act was in effect, and two days later that the Defense of Canada Regulations were in force. Under these provisions, the government claimed the power to ban political parties deemed subversive, censor the press, and intern any person deemed dangerous to public security. In the weeks that followed, 325 Canadian citizens and residents of German ancestry would be taken into custody. Once Italy declared war on the allies in June 1940, some 800 Italian Canadians would be rounded up en masse and interned.[90]

At the same time, hoping to appease opposition to the war (especially in Quebec, where French Canadians opposed intervention to support England), Prime Minister King pledged to limit Canada's direct involvement in combat and restricted Canada's military participation in Europe

to a single division. King promised not to impose conscription for overseas duty—a promise whose withdrawal after 1942 would set off angry debates inside Canada. However, in August 1940 the government adopted the National Resources Mobilization Act, which provided for universal manhood conscription for home duty. (Despite the ban on overseas service, there was vocal opposition to the act, especially among French Canadians. Montreal mayor Camillien Houde, who publicly called for resistance to conscription, was arrested and interned at a camp in Petawawa, Ontario, thereby becoming a popular martyr of draft resistance.)

The onset of war and the issue of military service revived the controversy over voting rights for Nisei. Defenders of Japanese Canadians argued that if the Nisei were called upon to fight for their country, they should be allowed suffrage rights. The Vancouver City Council responded by asking the federal government for assurances that no soldiers of Asian ancestry would be granted suffrage rights. Premier Duff Pattullo wrote Ottawa demanding a ban on conscription of Japanese Canadians. In addition to fearing the effect on public opinion in British Columbia (and the Liberals' electoral chances) of arming Japanese Canadians, King himself felt it was illogical to offer military training to Japanese Canadians. After all, he told his cabinet, Canada might soon go to war against Japan, and their loyalty was suspect.[91] In the end, a new parliamentary advisory group, the Special (later Standing) Committee on Orientals in British Columbia, was formed. Its membership was all white, and prominently included local politicians. Their mission was to investigate whether the hostility toward the Japanese (and Chinese) population in British Columbia represented a danger to national security, to recommend ways to either reduce hostility or take precautionary measures against activities "prejudicial to civil security or national defense," and most importantly to advise on permitting Nisei military service.[92] The committee strongly opposed extending the draft to Nisei.

On January 8, 1941, following the committee's report, Ottawa officially announced the exemption of Japanese Canadians (including veterans), although not Chinese, from conscription. King was careful to state publicly that the decision to exclude Nisei did not reflect "mistrust of their patriotism" but the possibility of hostile reaction and anti-Japanese race riots in British Columbia.[93] Still, the official discrimination eloquently testified to the importance of West Coast public opinion in driving official policy in Canada. Even the liberal *Vancouver News-Herald* praised the military exemption and called for a ban on all Japanese immigration,

although it deplored (with unconscious irony) scapegoating of Japanese residents: "We cannot send 20,000 people packing just because we do not like the color of their skins or their business methods or what their fellow Japanese do in China."[94] Nisei communities, despite strong expressions of resentment over the exclusion, turned to other methods to support the nation, including buying $42,000 worth of Victory bonds.[95] These proofs of loyalty failed to dent official mistrust. Rather, in March 1941, based on another recommendation of the Special Committee on Orientals, Ottawa imposed (or rather renewed) a registration requirement for all Japanese Canadians irrespective of citizenship (to avoid legal obstacles, registration by citizens was theoretically "voluntary"). The committee used the registration process to inquire into the loyalty of the ethnic Japanese community.[96] Following the process, each registrant was allotted special "Japanese" alien registration numbers.[97] Japanese nationals were required to report in monthly.

ROOSEVELT AND THE LEAD-UP TO WAR

In contrast to Canada's somewhat nominal participation among the Allies, the United States remained officially neutral on the war between 1939 and 1941, during most of which time public opinion remained sharply divided between the advocates of intervention and the different currents of the population who opposed it. Still, President Roosevelt and his advisors were actively concerned about the threat to world democracy and national security from both Germany and Japan. In the fall of 1939 Roosevelt pushed through Congress an amended Neutrality Act that permitted the United States to sell arms to nations at war on a "cash and carry" basis. Using a loophole in the law, the Americans sent airplanes to Canada and used the Dominion as a conduit to ship goods to Great Britain. In mid-1940, following the Nazi Blitzkrieg through Europe and the fall of France, the president reorganized his cabinet to include two internationalist Republicans, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. With Stimson's backing, Roosevelt arranged a special executive accord with Great Britain, then besieged by the threat of Nazi invasion, under which the Americans swapped fifty overage destroyers in exchange for leases on British bases in Newfoundland (then a separate British colony) and the Caribbean. Meanwhile, FDR proposed military

conscription for service in the Western Hemisphere. Following the vote in Congress, in September 1940 Roosevelt signed the Selective Service Act—the first peacetime draft in American history. Unlike the Canadian government, the U.S. War Department opened conscription to Japanese Americans—a point that will be discussed further in chapter 5. After the November presidential election, in which Franklin Roosevelt won an unprecedented third term, the White House announced a plan of military and economic aid, dubbed Lend-Lease, to allow a bankrupt Great Britain (and, following the Nazi invasion on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union) to carry on the burden of war. Following significant debate, Lend-Lease, too, was enacted by Congress in March 1941.

A secondary element of Roosevelt's wartime partnership with Great Britain was to strengthen Canadian-American military cooperation, which had been minimal throughout the interwar period.[98] FDR had already declared in a speech in Kingston, Ontario, in August 1938 that the United States "would not stand idly by" if Canada were ever invaded. In August 1940 he and Prime Minister Mackenzie King met officially at the Canadian-American border. The two released a joint statement, the Ogdensburg Agreement, in which they announced the creation of a Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Eight months later, following the enactment of Lend-Lease, the leaders of the two countries signed the Hyde Park Agreement, which cut Canada in on the Lend-Lease credits granted Great Britain and instituted a large-scale North American partnership in war production. Following these agreements, waves of Americans migrated to Canada to work on large-scale defense installations, notably the Alcan Highway linking the Alaska and the Canadian Northwest, where work would commence in the spring of 1942. Conversely, despite the pledges of cooperation there was little if any high-level coordination of policy, certainly where planning maneuvers was concerned.[99]

After the beginning of 1940, the United States took an increasingly hard line against Tokyo. In January the United States refused to renew the expiring 1911 Japanese-American Commercial Treaty, and in midyear the State Department instituted an embargo on export of strategic goods such as high-quality iron and steel in hopes of using economic pressure to squeeze Japan into renouncing its conquests. To demonstrate the power of American naval force, FDR ordered the Pacific fleet massed at Pearl Harbor, America's main forward base. Japan responded to the pressure by signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940,

allying itself definitively with the Axis and heightening American suspicions of the Japanese menace. Further American initiatives were hindered during the latter half of 1940 by the November election.

In February 1941 a new cabinet led by Prince Konoye, the emperor's brother, was formed. Konoye sent Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura to Washington in hopes of relaxing tensions. Although Roosevelt and his advisors placed scant trust in diplomacy to contain Japan, over the next several months Nomura and his associate Saburo Kurusu negotiated fruitlessly with U.S Secretary of State Cordell Hull in an atmosphere of growing mutual suspicion. In July, after Japan occupied French Indochina and threatened the rest of Southeast Asia, the United States cut off sales of high-octane gasoline for aviation, and through bureaucratic means soon halted all petroleum exports to Japan. Their goal was to use economic pressure to deter further Japanese aggression. It soon became clear that neither side was prepared to give up its position, and both prepared for the possibility of armed conflict. In November the Japanese presented the Roosevelt administration with their final proposal for a modus vivendi to avoid war. The Americans responded with an ultimatum of their own. Roosevelt and his military advisors, like many Americans, clearly understood that war was looming. The president had already polled his cabinet as to whether the American people would support the sending of an American fleet into Asia for a naval war with Japan, and Stimson had discussed the possibility of luring Japan into firing the first shot in such a conflict so as to justify American intervention. Nevertheless, fearing that an overt move would divide the country, the Roosevelt administration did not take definitive action, and it was Japan that set off open warfare with a devastating attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

THE MAGIC INTERCEPTS AND JAPANESE AMERICANS

As the United States drifted toward war with Japan, American concerns over Japanese espionage and counterintelligence efforts increased, especially since American military and civilian intelligence officials were aware of Japanese spying. An element of some (if indeterminate) importance in the American response to the Japanese threat was Operation MAGIC. In early 1941 American intelligence officers succeeded in breaking the secret diplomatic code used by Japan to communicate with its overseas officials. MAGIC was the code name given to the secret intercepts of those mes-

sages, which were made available to a small list of recipients, notably Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall. (President Roosevelt was on the list of recipients for a period but then was removed for several months after a copy of the intercepts was found in his oval office wastebasket.)[100]

Assertions about the value and interpretation of the MAGIC cables, and their impact on decision making, are difficult to assess, especially as against other sources of intelligence. The decrypts were raw data and not easily comprehensible—indeed, the army finally ceased distribution of MAGIC in early 1942 for that very reason—and it is not immediately clear which officials actually looked at them. What the cables did reveal were the assiduous efforts of the Japanese government, acting through consular officials and other agents, to recruit spies. To the extent that American political leaders and military officials automatically conflated Japanese Americans with agents of Tokyo, MAGIC and other counterintelligence products could have contributed to increasing hostility and mistrust toward Issei and Nisei among those who did have access to the information they contained.

That said, it would strain credulity to attribute further importance to MAGIC in regard to Japanese Americans. In recent years, several right-wing authors have claimed that the MAGIC intercepts demonstrate massive pro-Japanese espionage by Issei and Nisei in the prewar period and have relied on them to offer an ex post facto defense of the wartime confinement.[101] Still, even leaving aside the essential point that the West Coast military officers who would be chiefly responsible for the decision to remove Japanese Americans (as will be discussed in chapter 2) had no access to the MAGIC intercepts or the information contained within, an examination of the contents of the cables does not provide any serious case for implicating masses of Japanese Americans in espionage activities. Only a handful of the thousands of messages decrypted discuss overseas Japanese at all, and a portion of those come from Tokyo or Mexico City and refer to areas outside the United States. Those few cables that speak at all of the United States mention various efforts by agents from Japan to build espionage networks, but they project hopes or intentions rather than list concrete actions or results.[102] On January 30, 1941, a message from Japanese foreign minister Yosuke Matsuoka ordered Japanese consulates to increase their espionage efforts in the United States and authorized them to recruit "second generations." However, he advised against such recruitment, since Japanese Americans would be subjected

to "considerable persecution" if their activities were discovered. He therefore suggested that "utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations . . . would undoubtedly bear the best results."[103] The most serious indication of activity among Issei and Nisei was a memo from the Los Angeles consulate to Tokyo from May 1941, detailing the various actions of the consulate. Within the accounting, the cable stated, "We shall maintain connection with our second generations who are at present in the U.S. Army." From the language, the cable appears to speak of continuing efforts to recruit agents. (In the words of one analyst, the main phrase sounds like a bureaucrat's report justifying inactivity rather than a picture of success).[104] Similarly, the Los Angeles consulate reported some months later that it was doing all it could to recruit agents; that it would "maintain connections" with the Japanese associations and with Nisei in the army; and that it had made connections with Nisei in aircraft plants. Again, the cable did not state that any individuals had actually *been* recruited as agents, still less that they were actively giving information. On the contrary, the consulate made clear, once again, that it was concentrating on white people and Negroes and admitted that it could not "trust completely" the Japanese Americans.[105] There was indeed some cause for suspicion of Japanese Americans by Tokyo. As was revealed in postwar years, Ichiro Ted Miwa, a California Nisei, and his wife Edna traveled to Japan in mid-1941 in an unsuccessful effort to meet up with underground resistance agents and work against the militarist government.[106]

In sum, not only do the MAGIC intercepts not provide any specific information about any Japanese American spying, they tend to discredit the possibility. The essential fact is that all nineteen people who were arrested during World War II for being agents of Japan (of whom eleven were convicted) were white Americans. The same pattern of generalized propositions against specific refutations operates on the larger level of Japanese American loyalty. As historian John Stephan has demonstrated, Imperial Army staffers, with assistance from a few Japanese Americans, planned the invasion and occupation of Hawaii, sincerely believing that they would be actively welcomed by the local Japanese population.[107] However, the basis for this belief is unknown, and its reliability is not susceptible to evaluation. Conversely, Takeo Yoshikawa, the chief Japanese intelligence agent in Hawaii, who was in a position to observe directly, stated flatly that local Japanese Americans were not involved in any pro-

Japanese activity. "They had done nothing. . . . You see, I couldn't trust them in Hawaii to help me. They were loyal to the United States."[108]

PREWAR FEARS FOR SECURITY AND PREPARATIONS FOR CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Despite the lack of documented threat, during the eighteen months before Pearl Harbor the administration stepped up contingency planning for war with Japan, including curbs on Japanese Americans considered dangerous. After the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the U.S. government enormously increased its efforts to coordinate counterintelligence. In September 1939 Roosevelt ordered the Army G-2 division and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) to coordinate efforts with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep tabs on Japanese Americans, especially on the Pacific Coast. The ONI was given responsibility for collecting information on Japanese American communities, while the FBI followed individual subversives.[109] In 1940 FDR transferred the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Labor Department to the Justice Department to increase security and signed the Smith Act, which required registration by all aliens. In early 1941 the army's existing list of enemy alien "suspects" to be arrested and confined in case of war was united with lists compiled by the ONI and the FBI. The result was a master list of suspects maintained by the Justice Department, known as the "ABC list" (because individuals were assigned grades of A for "immediately dangerous," B for "potentially dangerous," or C for "possible Japan sympathizer"). Although the lists were confined to Issei (plus German and Italian aliens), their presence was primarily based on their positions—community leader, Buddhist or Shinto priest, etc.—rather than any notion of their individual sentiments or actions. The government took other action to target the Issei. Following persistent (if unfounded) reports of espionage by agents in fishing boats around military areas in Hawaii, in May 1941 officials of the Customs Service arrested eighty fishermen (mostly Issei, with a few Nisei) on charges of false registration and seized their boats.[110] In October 1941 the FBI launched a midnight raid on the Central Japanese Association, an Issei group linked with the Japanese consulate.

Authorities in Hawaii also tightened their grip. Army policy makers formulated detailed plans for martial law and total civilian control in case of war.[111] One widespread topic of discussion among both military and

civilian officials was preparing the forced evacuation and detention of the entire local Japanese population on an outlying island, such as the famous "leper island" of Molokai.[112] Meanwhile, naval commander Admiral Husband Kimmel ordered the airplanes based near Pearl Harbor to be bunched close together on the ground in order to guard them more easily against sabotage by Issei and Nisei. Despite the lack of evidence that such sabotage was likely, and the fact that bunching the planes made them easy targets for aerial bombardment, Kimmel considered the "local Japanese" the chief danger to security. With the support of the army and navy, the Hawaii Defense Act, a bill to grant broad powers to the governor in case of war, consistent with minimum safeguards for constitutional rights, was introduced into the territorial assembly during the spring of 1941. It grew entangled in partisan conflict and was killed.[113] Hoping to avert martial law, on September 15, 1941, Governor John Poindexter called the Hawaii legislature into special session in order to enact legislation for operations in case of war. General Short told legislators that such legislation would limit or prevent the need for martial law. As a result, the Hawaii Defense Act was passed into law in October.[114] Nevertheless, on November 4 Secretary of War Henry Stimson asked Congress to grant President Roosevelt emergency powers to declare martial law in Hawaii and Puerto Rico to prevent subversive activities. He pointed primarily to the threat posed by the forty thousand enemy aliens, mostly Japanese, residing in Hawaii.[115]

In tandem with its war plans, the executive branch prepared a network of camps designed for mass confinement of aliens. As early as October 1940, the Navy Department submitted to the president a list of potential steps to be taken to demonstrate the seriousness of American preparations for war, including plans for concentration camps.[116] Although the president told the navy not to proceed further without his approval, rumors of the existence of such facilities were soon widespread.[117] In October 1941 Brigadier General Irving J. Phillipson, commander of the Second Corps Area, publicly announced the completion at Camp Upton, New York, of a concentration camp for the "safeguarding of such aliens as the war department may deem it necessary to hold." The camp, built over the training area where the first draftees had been housed a year earlier, was designed to house seven hundred people. It consisted of a stockade and enclosure surrounded by barbed wire and guard posts with searchlights.

In his interview, Phillipson strongly implied that commanders of other corps areas were building their own camps.[118] In fact, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had already built detention centers at Fort Lincoln, North Dakota, and Fort Stanton, New Mexico, where some seven hundred German sailors who could not be deported were interned. Another thousand aliens, mostly Italian, were confined in Fort Missoula, Montana.[119] The Justice Department publicly affirmed in November that it was holding several hundred people accused of sabotage.[120] A few days later, Attorney General Francis Biddle acknowledged that the department had over two thousand German and Italian nationals in custody and was tripling the number of spaces in internment camps as war dangers became more serious.[121]

At the same time, the *Los Angeles Times* reported, Attorney General Biddle officially confirmed that the government had plans to intern "dangerous" Japanese aliens promptly if the U.S. and Japan should sever relations, and he added that what he referred to as concentration camps had been built to hold Japanese aliens. The article continued: "The government has plans for segregation of Nipponese alien groups for a 'temporary period' if relations between the United States and Japan are broken off. It was indicated that this might include government protection of the Japanese area here, numbering about 150,000 Japanese, by the Army and Navy."[122] It is not clear what this "protection" might consist of, nor whether the Justice Department or the *Times* was responsible for conflating Issei and Nisei (who together made up barely 110,000 people on the West Coast) as "Japanese."

Certainly, the attorney general, despite his proud reputation as a civil libertarian, sought to extend government control over aliens. In late November Biddle testified on behalf of H.R. 3, popularly known as the "Hobbs Concentration Camp Bill," a measure introduced earlier that year to provide for summary confinement for up to six months in a concentration camp or detention center of any alien who was deemed deportable by an immigration inspector or a three-person panel but who could not be deported, and for unlimited detention of "criminal aliens." The bill was extremely broad and severe. It provided for unlimited detention without hearing or due process of any alien who "at any time . . . shall act, or have acted, in the United States . . . on behalf of any foreign government or foreign political party or group," among which it explicitly named the Communist Party of the USA, the German American Bund, and the Kyffhaeuser Bund.[123] Biddle (following the policy set by his predecessor, Robert Jackson) supported the bill, despite protests by labor unions and civil liberties groups, insisting he simply wished to hold

deportable aliens who could not be expelled in the war emergency. Yet Representative Sam Hobbs of Alabama, the bill's sponsor, warned that aliens "pollute, degrade, and poison our body politic."[124] In any case, Opponents, such as Representative Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts, responded that the bill targeted aliens based only on their political or economic views, and would lead to creation of concentration camps similar to those of the Nazis. It was narrowly defeated in Congress a few weeks before Pearl Harbor, though as much through opposition by conservative Republicans who decried the expanded bureaucracy the bill would have created as from liberals concerned over civil liberties.[125] Its high-level sponsorship and broad support strongly suggested a strong official presumption of disloyalty among aliens.

JAPANESE AMERICANS ON THE SPOT

So far from supporting Japan, as war grew closer the Nisei rushed to demonstrate their American patriotism. After the beginning of 1940, the Nisei press and the JACL rapidly abandoned their support for Tokyo's occupation of China and adopted a neutral or hostile attitude toward Japan.[126] The Los Angeles Nisei Week festival, formerly a showcase of Japanese-American biculturalism, now became an American patriotic festival.[127] Groups such as the JACL pushed ever harder for renunciation of Japanese citizenship by Nisei and raised funds for the American Red Cross. Officers of the JACL, notably Fred Tayama, Ken Matsumoto, and Tokie Slocum, became (not very) confidential informants for the ONI. After Selective Service was instituted in mid-1940, several thousand Nisei men on Hawaii and the West Coast were inducted into the army and served honorably. Their dedicated service helped persuade liberals of the loyalty of Japanese Americans.[128]

Some Japanese Americans did seek the protection of influential allies. In March 1941 Gongoro Nakamura, an Issei legal counselor and president of the Central California Japanese Association, wrote the Department of Justice to ask whether Issei would be sent to concentration camps in case of war. Lemuel Schofield, special assistant to the attorney general, replied that law-abiding Japanese citizens would be treated as residents and not enemy aliens in case of war, and that no arbitrary confinement of any person could be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment.[129] Sufficient

Nakamura + Tanaka go to Washington

doubt remained over the future, however, that in October 1941 Nakamura, along with Nisei journalist Togo Tanaka, traveled to Washington to request an official statement on the Issei from the Justice Department. Attorney General Biddle affirmed that law-abiding Issei would not be harmed (the Nisei, being citizens, presumed they had ample constitutional protections and did not ask seriously about government attitudes toward *themselves* in case of war). Tanaka and Nakamura tried unsuccessfully to see the president as well. However, they did secure a meeting with Eleanor Roosevelt, the activist First Lady, who made an immediate public statement praising the loyalty of both Issei and Nisei.

In Hawaii, local Japanese leaders likewise pushed for demonstrations of loyalty, such as expatriation, and reached out to allies. As a spur to denationalization, Fred Makino proposed in the *Hawaii Hochi* that dual citizens be prohibited from public employment in the territory.[130] Some fifty thousand local Nisei, proclaiming their sole allegiance to the United States and seeking to facilitate the elimination of dual citizenship, signed a petition asking the U.S. State Department to use its influence to simplify the expatriation process.

The local Japanese also joined with prominent non-Japanese allies to protect the community in case of war. Hawaii's congressional delegate, Samuel Wilder King, was an influential champion of the Nisei in Washington. "Frankly, my sympathies are with these young Americans. Their record in this Territory is as high, or higher, than that of any of the recent immigrant groups of the mainland. . . . They take their citizenship seriously, and they accept their obligations and duties as citizens conscientiously."[131] In April 1941 King carried the denationalization petition to Washington and presented it to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, whose department was responsible for overseeing the territory.[132] Charles E. Hemenway, a liberal businessman and University of Hawaii trustee and a scion of the plantation oligarchy, convened a race relations advisory group that brought together members of various racial groups with local FBI chief Robert Shivers and military intelligence officers to maximize morale and security.[133] Nisei school administrator Shigeo Yoshida (who had gained public notice during testimony at the 1937 congressional hearings on statehood by alleging that he would find it easier to face the Japanese enemy in war than to stand up under the endless suspicion and criticism the Nisei faced) became a central member of the group.[134]

Both in Hawaii and the mainland, the dominant tone among Nisei writers and newspaper columnists (as well as some Issei) was a sense that Japanese Americans were "on the spot." In mid-1941 editor James Omura of the San Francisco–based Nisei monthly *Current Life* stated, "WE ARE AT WAR." Reminding readers of the "inhuman persecution" of German Americans during the First World War, he added that the same "can and will happen to us Nisei Americans unless we take cognizance of the future now." Omura recommended Nisei political and social organization into such bodies as the Japanese American Citizens League, strenuous efforts to gain the goodwill of the surrounding community, and lying low to avoid potential violence: "We are all under suspicion. We are all being observed, whether by our neighbors or by federal agents. We should act accordingly. We know we have nothing to conceal, but this does not preclude the fact that people living around us may not know it. And we cannot produce convincing enough evidence to acquit ourselves of suspicion. Our course, then, is to remain inconspicuous."[135]

A sympathetic observer, sociologist Forrest La Violette, argued in similar terms, asserting that the growing war climate between Japan and the United States was forcing Japanese Americans to choose sides more clearly, a process that could have positive results for clarifying the marginal position the Nisei held in both American and Japanese communities. "This means that individuals are now more fully committed to being Americans. It means a more definite incorporation into the American social system. American national sentiments are for the time being superior to family sentiments which may have their roots in Japan." However, La Violette was prophetic on the dangers that still loomed in case of war: "Rumors have it that the *Nisei* would be the first to be sent to the front; others say they will be sent to concentration camps. One *nisei* told the writer that he was fattening himself up for the 'long lean days behind barb [*sic*] wire.'"[136]

As if to confirm La Violette's words, the war crisis also heightened popular xenophobia and rumor-mongering. Throughout the 1930s, West Coast tabloids and popular magazines had spread improbable tales of Japanese American spies and saboteurs, especially in connection with Japanese activities in Mexico and Latin America. In 1938–39, *Ken* magazine (apparently using material obtained through naval intelligence files) published a series of articles by John Spivak accusing fishermen in Little Tokyo of massive spying at the Panama Canal.[137] Syndicated columnist Sutherland Denlinger stated, "No informed person would deny that Japanese

espionage constitutes a real problem in Hawaii." While many of the spies disguised as fishermen were "Japanese," he insisted that some were Nisei: "This second generation Japanese of American birth is not always . . . the indoctrinated citizen of the United States of happy fancy."[138] *Liberty* magazine (repeating past charges that had already been discredited) ran a series of articles that purported to cite naval intelligence officers as affirming that 250 Japanese torpedo boats had been camouflaged as fishing boats. In a 1940 article, author Jerry D. Lewis claimed that once war broke out between Japan and the United States, these boats would emerge, cripple all American warships, destroy portside gasoline supplies, and burn harbors.[139]

In the tense atmosphere during 1940 and 1941, nativists and headline hunters circulated further unfounded stories of Japanese American disloyalty, whipping up hysteria against Japanese communities. Lail Kane of the California American Legion, which sponsored bills to bar Issei from being granted fishing licenses, told Nisei, "If we ever have war with Japan and I have anything to do with it, the first thing I'll do will be to intern every one of you."[140] The celebrated evangelist Sister Aimee Semple McPherson called for the government to get rid of all Issei truck farmers because "they could poison crops in time of a war."[141] A former FBI agent, Blayney F. Matthews, charged that Issei truck farmers sprayed their crops with arsenic to poison them, and the story spread even after FBI inquiries demonstrated that the charges were fabricated.[142] Another story spread that a Kibei soldier in San Diego had bragged that he would fight for Japan if war broke out and that all Nisei soldiers were then rounded up. The story spread widely despite immediate and authoritative denials.[143] Perhaps the most fertile developer of anti-Japanese propaganda was a Korean nationalist, Kilsoo Haan of the Sino-Korean People's League, who accused Japanese Americans of organizing subversion and aid for Tokyo through the Black Dragon Society.[144]

Various officials joined the anti-Japanese American wave. In October 1940 California Republican Richard J. Welch recommended that all "Japanese fishermen and their families" be relocated away from Terminal Island and other army and navy facilities because they were "non-assimilable."[145] In January 1941, using information in part provided by Kilsoo Haan, Iowa Senator Guy Gillette repeatedly alleged, despite indignant denials by Tokyo, that Japan was conscripting Japanese American dual citizens, including fifty thousand military-age Nisei in Hawaii.[146] In the summer of 1941 Representative Martin Dies of Texas, chair of the

House Un-American Activities Committee, seized the national spotlight by announcing that he would convene a set of hearings on espionage and subversive activities of Japanese on the West Coast. On July 31 Dies publicly stated that he had acquired massive evidence of subversion by Japanese naval officers, who he alleged were meeting with Japanese American fishermen at Terminal Island. Fishing craft, he charged, were being transformed into torpedo boats, which sailed out into international waters for drill practice. Dies threatened to hold public hearings unless the Justice Department promptly arrested all concerned, adding that he favored a preventive roundup of all "Japanese seamen" in the United States to protect against subversion.[147] After FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover noted that Dies's public statements did not match his private ones and cast doubt on his information, the Justice Department refused to take any action.[148] His bluff called, Dies announced in September that he had turned over his information to the White House and had suspended his hearings at the request of the president and of Secretary of State Cordell Hull.[149] In August 1941, after Tokyo refused to permit 100 U.S. nationals to leave Japan, Representative John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan, urged that 10,000 Japanese aliens in Hawaii be confined as hostages until Japan released the Americans. Conflating Issei and Nisei populations, Dingell added that the government could then use the territory's remaining 150,000 Japanese aliens as a reserve hostage force pending Japan's next move.[150]

The unjust targeting of Japanese Americans as disloyal by white nativists was clear to a number of outside observers. Magner White of *The Saturday Evening Post*, who conducted interviews with over 100 Nisei over two months in mid-1939, concluded that they were loyal Americans.[151] In October 1940 *Life* deplored discrimination against the Nisei, who wore their citizenship with pride. "Their U.S. citizenship and patriotic loyalties mean little to race conscious Americans. Their color imposes a barrier which few of them ever manage to transcend."[152] Independent journalists Jim Marshall and Ernest Hauser reached similar conclusions.[153]

KENNETH RINGLE AND THE MUNSON REPORT

In response to their justified concern over Japanese espionage, fortified by the rumors of Japanese American disloyalty, government and army officials continued to investigate Japanese Americans, despite a mountain of reliable evidence that the actual threat they represented, particularly the Nisei, was greatly exaggerated. In November 1940 the FBI's Honolulu branch (which had been closed in 1931 and only reactivated shortly before) reported that, outside of a small "esoteric" (and easily identifiable) group of consular officials and Japanese schoolteachers, most of whom had been in Hawaii for only a short time, the long-resident local Japanese community was Americanized in culture and ideas and largely loyal to the United States.[154]

In March 1941 ONI intelligence officer Kenneth Ringle led a daring midnight raid on the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles and discovered detailed information on Japanese spy networks. His findings allowed the American government to break up the Tachibana spy ring. Drawing on the information he recovered and on his close familiarity with the status of Japanese espionage efforts, Ringle would repeatedly advise his superiors over the following months that Japanese American communities were loyal—that, indeed, Japanese agents were suspicious of Nisei as "cultural traitors" not to be trusted—and did not pose a security threat as a whole.[155]

Perhaps the most significant government project to investigate the loyalty of West Coast Issei and Nisei came in the shape of the Munson report. In early 1941 President Roosevelt, dissatisfied with the intelligence he was receiving from all official agencies, commissioned the writer/journalist John Franklin Carter to organize an unofficial political intelligence unit, which was paid through undisclosed White House funds. In the fall of 1941 Roosevelt commissioned Carter to investigate secretly the Japanese American communities on the West Coast and Hawaii and assess their loyalty. Carter selected Curtis B. Munson, who had previously impressed Roosevelt by his investigative report on the political situation in Martinique, to pursue an undercover investigation. (Carter simultaneously dispatched other agents to report on Japanese activities in Texas and Mexico). Munson visited the West Coast, adopting the guise of a State Department official. Although he was not a professional investigator, his inquiry was lent credibility by the assistance and records he received from the FBI and ONI, and the testimony of the numerous Japanese Americans he interviewed.

Munson rapidly reached the conclusion, as he put it, that "there is no Japanese Problem." While there might be the odd fanatic who might commit sabotage, he told Roosevelt, the majority of Issei were actively

or passively loyal to the United States and would eagerly take U.S. citizenship if it were permitted them. The Nisei (apart from the Kibei) he estimated at 90–98 percent loyal, and he added, "They are pathetically eager to show this loyalty." Munson concluded that the greatest danger to security lay in violence against Japanese Americans rather than in disloyal action by them. He and his assistant Warren Irwin urged that the government take immediate steps to enlist the loyalty of the Nisei through supportive public statements by political leaders, and by assuring Issei and Nisei that they would not be put into concentration camps in the event of war.[156] Munson visited Honolulu immediately after leaving the West Coast, and during the first week of December he reported in a summary memorandum that the attitude of the Japanese Americans there was substantially identical to that on the West Coast. Although FDR was willing to consider provisions for protecting "loyal Japanese" from attacks in case of war, he dismissed Munson's conclusions about their loyalty as "nothing much new" and did not order the surveillance relaxed.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the fears of Japanese American disloyalty before December 7, 1941, while not entirely without foundation, were based overwhelmingly on bias. Government and military officials were legitimately concerned about Tokyo's direction of espionage activities. It is difficult not to sympathize with the frustration of those entrusted with national defense over the limits of their sources in regard to Japanese activities, and the task of determining the authenticity and reliability of information amid the myriad invented tales of subversion launched by race-baiting journalists, agitators, and unscrupulous government officials. Nevertheless, political leaders and intelligence officials acted on the basis of unexamined race-based assumptions about Japanese Americans. They failed to make any real distinction between agents infiltrated from Japan, who were clearly loyal to Tokyo, and the mass of American citizens and long-term residents of Japanese ancestry who were expending considerable effort to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Instead, officials in Washington approved extensive surveillance of Issei and Nisei and prepared mass actions against them, including concentration camps and protective custody. The government considered Japanese Americans inherently dan-

gerous and did not relax these control efforts even in the face of evidence regarding their lack of involvement in subversion. Ethnic Japanese communities did, in fact, have a record of attachment to Japan and support for Japanese policy in Asia, particularly in its aggression in China. However, there were not and have never been any documented cases of sabotage or spying by any West Coast Japanese Americans (or, with the inconsiderable exception of Kotoshirodo, any in Hawaii). In fact, when the United States occupied Japan after the end of World War II and Americans working in the occupation read through Japanese documents from before the war, they were unable to discover any evidence from such documents that remained that the Japanese Americans helped Japan. Although twenty people were charged and convicted with performing espionage for Japan before the war, none was a Japanese American.

Tetsuden Kashima has argued that in the prewar period the government engaged in such widespread preparations for internment that a bureaucratic momentum was created and would have resulted in mass confinement no matter how war eventually came.[157] This may overstate the case somewhat, as neither mass confinement of the entire group nor mass occupation of Japanese neighborhoods, both of which were discussed in the prewar period, actually occurred once war was declared. Still, if the government's and military's well-developed plans for the establishment of concentration camps and internment of Japanese aliens do not add up to their subsequent policy of mass confinement of all Japanese Americans, neither can it be said, based on such evidence, that their actions after Pearl Harbor were simply in reaction to the surprise bombing, without precedent or forethought. On the contrary, the prewar hysteria created a climate of suspicion and hostility that made arbitrary action logical (and politically expedient) afterwards.

Similarly, white Californians and British Columbians, following a long tradition of anti-Japanese racism, contributed to the torrent of negative opinion that overwhelmed Issei and Nisei. Newspaper articles and politicians continued to describe all ethnic Japanese residents, whatever their background and citizenship, as a monolithic whole that could be assumed on racial grounds to offer primary loyalty to Tokyo. Reliable evidence to the contrary offered by objective reporters was effectively ignored. Well before the onset of the Pacific War, nativists and publicity seekers manufactured widespread and demonstrably false stories of Japanese American fifth columnists. These stories left government officials prepared—even overprepared—to believe the worst, and expect the worst, of Issei and

Nisei after Pearl Harbor. If the Japanese bombing in Hawaii lent greater plausibility to stories of subversion spread by West Coast whites, it also rationalized pre-existing and reflexive suspicions born of prejudice, which existed independent of any fact. It was these suspicions that led the Canadian government, even without evidence of subversion, to close its armed forces to Nisei in January 1941. The reactions of West Coast whites would be similarly decisive in settling the fate of the Issei and Nisei in both countries during 1942.

[2] THE DECISION TO REMOVE ETHNIC JAPANESE FROM THE WEST COAST

PEARL HARBOR AND ITS AFTERMATH

On the morning of December 7, 1941, Japanese naval and air forces executed a mass bombing raid on the United States Naval Station at Pearl Harbor, chief base of the navy's Pacific fleet, and on other American military bases on the island of Oahu. The attack, launched without warning, devastated the fleet; Japanese planes sunk or damaged eight battleships and ten lesser ships. The raid was also costly in human life. According to official statistics, 2,390 American soldiers and civilians were killed in the bombing, and 1,178 more were wounded. Japanese bombers subsequently launched a similarly devastating bombardment of the fortifications of the American colony of the Philippines.

A curious, if minor, incident occurred after one Japanese plane crash-landed on the remote (and privately owned) Hawaiian island of Niihau. Although none of the island's residents had been informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they took the pilot, Airman 1st Class Shigenori Nishikaichi, into custody. Nishikaichi persuaded a local Nisei, Yoshio Harada, who was new to the island, to help him recover his papers. After terrorizing the island's residents, the two were cornered by local resident Ben Kanahele, even as a relief force headed by a local Nisei, Jack Mizuha, prepared to relieve the beleaguered island. Kanahele shot Nishikaichi, and Harada committed suicide.[1]

The government's pre-existing, exaggerated fears of Japanese Americans played an important role in amplifying the disaster at Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. As mentioned, the airplanes based at Hickam Field had been bunched close together on the ground in order to guard them more easily against the danger of sabotage by local Issei and Nisei. Japanese bombs caught the American planes on the ground during the first wave

fessors Jesse Steiner and Robert O'Brien and California CIO secretary Louis Goldblatt denounced the movement for evacuation as racist and harmful. However, they were drowned out by opposing voices and skeptical questioners.[9]

Apart for the hearings, few commentators outside the West Coast paid much attention, positive or negative, to the military orders and the implementation of removal plans on the West Coast. Most Americans no doubt assumed that there was a real danger, and the government knew what it was doing. By and large, liberal and left-wing groups failed to make any significant protest, and there was little organized opposition outside of a small circle of progressive church groups such as the American Friends Service Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. The American Communist Party, which had expelled its Nisei members after Pearl Harbor as part of its strategy of full support for the war effort, expressed strong approval for evacuation. Minority groups were mixed in their reaction. Jewish organizations, many of which were led by Roosevelt supporters, were silent or positive, though various individual Jews protested. Similarly, although African American groups took no official action, individual African Americans proved to be disproportionately visible among supporters of the rights of Japanese Americans. In particular, *Pittsburgh Courier* columnist George Schuyler and the editors of the *Los Angeles Tribune* published numerous articles in opposition to the government's policy. In contrast, Mexican Americans remained largely silent. A few individuals opposed removal. However, the conservative Los Angeles daily *La Opinion*, the largest Mexican American newspaper, endorsed mass removal of Issei and Nisei, whom it termed "actual or potential enemies of the United States," and opening up landownership and economic opportunity for Mexican immigrants.[11]

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the major organization that defended constitutional rights of Americans, was equivocal and compromised in its support of Japanese Americans. When a set of board members of the ACLU, led by Director Roger Baldwin, sent a letter to the White House asking for the institution of loyalty hearings for Issei and Nisei, a circle of ACLU board members—many of them Jews sympathetic to the New Deal—called a board referendum. The result was that the board, by majority vote, barred the ACLU from directly challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066. ACLU lawyers were authorized to support legal challenges to the order's discriminatory enforce-

ment against Japanese Americans, but the concession of principle involved clearly made for a much weaker case.[12]

The only national political organization to oppose the removal publicly was the Socialist Party, which had been discredited by its leaders' prewar opposition to military intervention. Socialist leader Norman Thomas denounced the government's actions as "totalitarian Justice" in a series of newspaper and magazine articles, in radio talks, and in a pamphlet, "Democracy and Japanese Americans." Other party members organized lobbying and aid efforts and wrote in the party newspaper, the *Call*.[13] Working under the auspices of the Post War World Council in New York City, Norman Thomas circulated a petition calling for the immediate rescission of the president's order. Some two hundred intellectuals and progressives signed, including a number of well-known individuals, such as novelist Pearl S. Buck, writer/activist W.E.B. DuBois, and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. However, the petition failed to alter official policy. Thomas himself claimed shortly afterward that he had never seen an important issue on which he had experienced more difficulty in arousing the American public, particularly liberals and labor unionists.[14]

JAPANESE AMERICAN REACTIONS

Japanese Americans, who had been largely taken by surprise by Executive Order 9066, were dazed by the onslaught against them. The response of the Issei to mass removal has often been described, in somewhat exaggerated terms, as a passive acceptance based on a sense of *shigata kanai* (a Japanese expression meaning "Go fight City Hall" or "It can't be helped"). Farmwife Fumi Kawaguchi told her diary of feeling relieved that the uncertainty everyone had been facing would soon be over. "[My husband] came home and said it was announced at last that this coastline area 70 to 80 miles around will have to be evacuated in about 60 days. If this is so, at least it's better than not knowing." Nevertheless, Issei from the region actively considered mass migration, despite the logistical and financial obstacles to such a move—the Kawaguchi family ended up organizing a caravan and migrating to central Utah to escape camp.[15]

Although small groups of Nisei, as mentioned, had met with California Governor Olson and with federal officials during February, community leaders had scarcely been consulted regarding their opinions

or plans for action, and the Nisei only belatedly realized that their citizenship rights were in danger of being violated. In the days after the president's order was announced, community newspaper commentaries ranged from disbelief and anger to relief that at least decisions about their fate were being taken out of the hands of local (and racist) authorities.[16] Sue Kunitomi Embrey later recalled: "We had all these meetings in Little Tokyo. I went to one of them. There were some people who wanted to protest and others who wanted to wait and see what the government was going to do. There was a big debate over whether we should go quietly and cooperate with the government, or whether everybody should go on their own wherever they could. There was a lot of opposition to that because of all the discrimination out there."[17]

The range of Nisei views was revealed in testimony before the Tolan Committee. San Francisco journalist James Omura, despite his previous support for spying on potentially disloyal Nisei, attacked evacuation forthrightly: "Has the Gestapo come to America? Have we not risen in righteous anger at Hitler's mistreatment of Jews? Then is it not incongruous that citizen Americans of Japanese descent should be mistreated and persecuted?"[18] However, most Nisei questioned by the Tolan Committee tried their best to balance assertions of their citizenship rights with assurances of patriotic loyalty. Michio Kunitani of the Oakland Nisei Democrats asserted that Nisei liked baseball, jazz, and hot dogs just as other Americans did and expressed great skepticism about the racist motives behind the call for evacuation. JACL secretaries Henry Tani and Mike Masaoka asserted their Americanness and protested the involvement of pressure groups in the movement for evacuation. All but Omura, however, agreed that Japanese Americans would support the government's action as an emergency measure. "With any policy of evacuation definitely arising from reasons of military necessity and national safety, we are in complete agreement."[19]

In the end, despite grave misgivings, the executive board of the Japanese American Citizens League, the largest Nisei group, decided the organization had no choice but to support the government. Many other Nisei leaders followed suit, in varying degrees: Togo Tanaka, English editor of *Rafu Shimpo*, urged his readers in a headline, "Let's Cooperate Cheerfully!" Organized opposition by a small and vulnerable group during wartime, the leaders reasoned—no doubt correctly—would be suicidal in triggering wholesale military intervention, and might confirm the taint of disloyalty on which mass evacuation had already been based. Much

better to compromise on principle on a temporary wartime step, they decided, and to concentrate on defending their citizenship rights. In hopes of having a voice in the fate of the Nisei, the JACL offered the government its assistance with planning and implementing evacuation. The JACL's policy of collaboration, which presented the odd spectacle of a civil rights organization colluding in mass violations of civil rights, was a fatal step that split the community and ultimately caused lasting bitterness among those who accused the JACL of "selling the Nisei down the river."[20]

Most Issei and Nisei alike were apprehensive and saddened to be removed from their homes to face an uncertain future, and they reacted as best as they could, by continuing to work and by making arrangements for their departure. West Coast newspaper editors devoted themselves to assisting relocation, even as they wound up their own journals. Togo Tanaka (along with the JACL and other groups) recruited volunteers to help establish an Assembly Center at Manzanar in California's Owens Valley, first by building barracks and facilities, later by conducting automobile convoys to the center. Larry Tajiri, longtime editor of the San Francisco *Nichi Bei* (with assistance from Isamu Noguchi) intervened with the Office of War Information in hopes of creating a government-sponsored vernacular newspaper to help keep Japanese Americans informed. Offered a job by the OWI, Tajiri agreed instead to take over the JACL newsletter *The Pacific Citizen*. After following the JACL to its new quarters in Salt Lake City, Tajiri and his wife Guyo transformed the journal into a nationally based biweekly newspaper.[21]

A number of Nisei designed schemes for large-scale voluntary migration and resettlement. For example, Isamu Noguchi presented a comprehensive plan for government-sponsored resettlement by Japanese American farmers and craft workers in pioneer communities on public land so that they could contribute food to the war effort. San Francisco-area nurseryman Hi Korematsu (whose brother Fred would soon after challenge evacuation in court) proposed the establishment of farm cooperatives in desert areas. James Sakamoto, editor of the Seattle-based *Japanese-American Courier*, wrote to the White House to propose colonization of interior agricultural areas by caravans of West Coast farmers. Fred Wada, an Oakland-based produce merchant, organized a caravan of 130 Japanese Americans and moved to Utah, where he founded a successful agricultural cooperative. However, federal officials were unprepared to offer encouragement or large-scale financial or material help to make relocation possible, although a small number of Japanese Americans who

submitted a detailed "relocation plan" for official approval received token sums from the army for transportation expenses.[22]

A few brave individuals, with the aid of sympathetic non-Japanese counsel, challenged Executive Order 9066. Gordon Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, and Minoru Yasui, an Oregon-born attorney, deliberately violated the official curfew and registration requirements and sought arrest in order to bring legal challenges.[23] Soon after, Fred Korematsu, who tried to evade removal by passing as non-Japanese before being caught and apprehended, was recruited as a test case by Ernest Besig of the Northern California ACLU. Lincoln Kanai and Mr. and Mrs. Ernest Wakayama also brought suit in federal court challenging incarceration.[24]

Here, once again, the JACL was caught in an unhappy dilemma by its decision to advocate collaboration with the federal government. Believing that legal challenges to government actions would be destructive, the JACL refused to support the test cases and issued public statements denouncing the plaintiffs.[25] Yet JACL leaders did take actions to support the rights of Japanese Americans. For example, the organization officially endorsed Norman Thomas's pamphlet "Democracy and Japanese Americans," which criticized removal and called for immediate reversal and reparations, and the JACL arranged for its widespread distribution to supportive groups. Also, its members held fast in support of the principle of citizenship, in the face of action by militant nativists. During the spring of 1942 the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West, represented by former California attorney general Ulysses S. Webb, brought a lawsuit in federal court, *Regan v. King*, to overturn the citizenship and voting rights of Nisei. With assistance from ACLU attorney A. L. Wirin and support from a set of African American attorneys, Loren Miller, Hugh Macbeth, and Thomas Griffith, the JACL successfully opposed the suit.[26]

The Nisei dilemma of loyalty versus civil rights was ironically dramatized by an incident in New York City on June 18, 1942. JACL Secretary Mike Masaoka accepted Norman Thomas's invitation to join a forum on Japanese Americans, sponsored by the Post War World Council and attended by representatives of a coalition of groups. At the forum, Thomas introduced a resolution opposing "military internment of unaccused persons in concentration camps" and calling for the immediate convening of hearing boards to determine the loyalty of those held. Masaoka expressed his support. Stating that the treatment of the Nisei was a "test of democracy," he warned his listeners "If they can do it to one group, they can do it to other groups."[27] The resolution was swiftly opposed by delegates of the New York-based Japanese American Committee for Democracy (JACD), a circle of progressive Issei and Nisei who were influenced by the Communist Party and its policy of 100 percent support for the war effort. The JACD members introduced a counterresolution approving roundup of potential Axis supporters and affirming that criticism of government policy hampered the war effort.[28] The JACD resolution was defeated, but the intervention prevented the meeting from reaching any consensus on reconsideration of Executive Order 9066.[29]

THE CONDITION OF HAWAII'S JAPANESE AMERICANS

The signing of Executive Order 9066 and its aftermath were mirrored during 1942 by a tug-of-war over the status of Japanese Americans in Hawaii, in which opposing factions expressed differing views and the president and his advisors faced off against the territory's military and civilian rulers. Over the weeks following Pearl Harbor, in the shadow of a potential Japanese invasion, the new military governor's office began a process of reconstruction and conversion of the territory to a wartime footing. While the army operated, as mentioned, on a formally race-neutral basis, it privately and publicly justified its rule over the territory by the "Japanese threat." This meant primarily the threat of invasion from Tokyo, but it was also sometimes defined to include locals.

At the same time, wartime uncertainty and fear of invasion bred a climate of public anxiety that was easily deflected onto local Japanese. Those Issei on the "ABC lists," as well as some Nisei, who were arrested in the hours after Pearl Harbor were confined at the internment camp at Sand Island. They bore the brunt of ambient suspicion and hostility against the entire community. Beyond being confined without charge, they were subjected to continual strip searches, kept busy on mindless labor jobs, and denied contact with families.[30] The Issei and Nisei outside, who were cut off from the rest of the nation and received only censored letters and news bulletins, could not but be aware that their own fragile liberty rested on sufferance and that they would face mass repression at the least sign of any conduct deemed "disloyal." The supportive efforts of Japanese American aid workers after Pearl Harbor, the patriotic activities of Nisei in the 298th and 299th Infantry Units, and their rush to take up service in

not use moral suasion to suspend the laws of supply and demand—the Japanese Americans who were facing impending removal were forced to take the best offer they could get for their immovable property, and bargain sales of farms and household items continued.[55] Car owners had the choice of leasing or selling them or of storing them at their own expense. Those who refused and chose to drive themselves and their belongings to assembly centers were then required to sell their cars either to the military or to civilians, on pain of official seizure and requisitioning.

Meanwhile, despite complaints from the Tolan Committee, the army delayed making storage facilities available to Japanese Americans. The Federal Reserve Bank ultimately contracted out limited warehouse space, at army expense, to store evacuee belongings but did not provide guards or insurance for such facilities, with the result that they were vandalized and pillaged during the war. In the end, the vast majority of Japanese Americans were forced to either entrust their belongings to white friends (many of whom damaged or never returned them) or church groups, throw them out, or sell them off, generally at fire-sale prices. A postwar study, which took lost income as well as lost property into account, estimated the total damage wrought by mass confinement at $347 million. Researchers in later decades, using different methods, ultimately estimated total losses by Japanese Americans during evacuation at between 67 and 116 million dollars (1945 dollars).[56]

THE SHIFT TO INVOLUNTARY EVACUATION

The army soon decided that the process of "voluntary evacuation" was too slow and cumbersome. More important, mountain state authorities complained to DeWitt about the negative public reaction to the Japanese passing through, although there was no actual wave of violence against the migrants. The government's own removal policy was largely responsible for the unfriendly attitude because it placed an enormous stigma on Japanese Americans among Americans nationwide. As Philip Glick, WRA Solicitor, put it, "The agitation for mass evacuation had repeatedly asserted that West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry were of uncertain loyalty. The government's later decision to evacuate was widely interpreted as proof of the truth of that assertion."[57] Residents of these interior areas assumed that if the Japanese Americans were too danger-

ous to remain on the coast, they should not be "dumped" into the region. Continual (exaggerated or unfounded) newspaper stories about arrests of Japanese Americans for possession of contraband or violation of curfew fueled panic.[58]

Although in theory such matters were unrelated to any issue of military necessity and hence unworthy of consideration, DeWitt bowed to the popular pressure. On March 27, 1942, he ordered all departures by Japanese Americans out of the excluded zone halted within forty-eight hours. (DeWitt ordered residents to await official removal, but his announcement nevertheless set off a final movement of desperate refugees fleeing inland.) The general responded to popular pressure in other ways as well. At the request of white Arizona farmers fearful of losing their Japanese American labor force, DeWitt redrew the borders of the West Coast military area to leave certain districts in central Arizona unrestricted. Similarly, in June 1942, in response to pressure from East Californians fearful of entering Japanese Americans, the general suddenly declared the California section of Military Area 2 an excluded area. The five thousand migrants who had moved to the region, mostly on short notice, relying on the general's promise that they would not be evacuated, were trapped and subsequently rounded up and incarcerated.[59]

Once voluntary migration was halted, the Western Defense Command prepared and executed involuntary mass removal. General DeWitt, at least initially, considered wholesale removal unnecessary and beyond the Army's capacities. Nevertheless, the War Department chiefs—despite their continued insistence, then and later, that their removal policy was based on the judgment of the military commander on the spot—left him no choice in the matter.[60] Shortly thereafter, the War Department also formally overruled DeWitt's unpopular plan to empty the Western Defense Command of German and Italian aliens. As a result, only individual German and Italian aliens considered dangerous were ever arrested, and they had a right to speedy administrative hearings where they could present witnesses and evidence to prove their loyalty. A small fraction of these aliens, who were unable to establish their innocence, were interned. In contrast, the Western Defense Command refused to institute loyalty hearings for *any* Japanese Americans, irrespective of citizenship, or to segregate pro-Japanese and pro-American elements, on the grounds that this would undercut the entire basis for mass removal—that the loyalty of Japanese Americans could not be determined or trusted.[61]

The extreme nature of the removal policy and the racist ideas that underlay it were starkly demonstrated by General DeWitt's insistence that all people of Japanese ancestry be cleared from the West Coast, and that no exceptions be granted. Apart from those Japanese Americans who were incarcerated in prisons and those confined in hospitals who were too ill to be moved (plus one older navy veteran, presumably protected by naval authorities, who was exempted for his meritorious service), Japanese Americans of all ages were carried away. Even the army language school at the Presidio, with its Japanese instructors, was forced to decamp.[62] Colonel Bendetsen carried out the "no exceptions" policy with horrifying literalness. As DeWitt's final report on the evacuation stated, "Included among the evacuees were persons who were only part Japanese, some with as little as one-sixteenth Japanese blood; others who, prior to evacuation, were unaware of their Japanese ancestry; and many who had married Caucasians, Chinese, Filipinos, Negroes, Hawaiians, or Eskimos."[63] Not since the denial of citizenship rights in the Jim Crow South to those with tiny gradations of African American ancestry had a single ancestor been determined to have such an inherent corrupting force. The army quickly drew up a mixed marriage policy, based on a tortured mixture of gender, biological, and sociological stereotypes. According to this policy, ethnic Japanese women who were married to white American men or those from "friendly" countries (generally Filipinos), plus the mixed-race children of these marriages, could be exempted from evacuation on a case-by-case basis, depending on their overall level of "Americanization" (that is, assimilation to white American norms). If these Japanese women divorced their husbands or were widowed, they would then be immediately subject to removal. Conversely, non-Japanese wives and unemancipated mixed-race children of Japanese American men would be spared evacuation—but *not* the Japanese American men themselves. In fact, a number of Caucasian women, including artist Estelle Ishigo and activist Elaine Black Yoneda, and their children accompanied their family members to camp.[64] Bendetsen and his aides stripped Japanese American children from their Caucasian foster families and toured orphanages to make sure that any infant or child who appeared to have Japanese ancestry would be removed. The Shonien orphanage, which housed Japanese American children, organized a "children's village" at the Manzanar camp for the orphans in their charge.

Once mass removal was decreed, Bendetsen and the WCCA assumed full responsibility for carrying out the operation. WCCA staffers divided

up Military Area 1 into a set of 99 (later 108) exclusion areas and produced plans for removing the ethnic Japanese populations of each district. The Census Bureau, in an illegal breach of confidentiality, provided an advisor who obtained raw data from 1940 census files, with precise details on the ethnic Japanese population of individual city blocks and tracts. This information enabled the Western Defense Command to divide up districts efficiently and locate Issei and Nisei inside.[65] Meanwhile, in order not to interrupt food production, the army ordered Japanese American farmers to continue with their spring planting on pain of arrest for interference with the war effort, even though they recognized that the farmers would not be permitted to remain long enough to produce the season's harvest. In the end, the overwhelming majority of Nikkei farmers were forced to abandon their farms to white (or in some cases Hispanic) tenants and purchasers and were unable to realize any profit from the expense and arduous labor they devoted to growing their crops during 1942.[66]

Evacuation began in the last week of March 1942, with the most militarily sensitive districts given priority. (Bainbridge Island, near Seattle, Washington, which the navy considered a danger zone, was the first area to be emptied.) The Western Defense Command created "civil control stations" in schools and other public buildings in the designated districts, then posted notices on billboards, schools, and windows. The notices proclaimed the evacuation of all Japanese Americans within the boundaries of the delineated area and gave them seven days to report for evacuation. The notices also required a member of each family to register immediately at the station. There they received identification numbers and directions for evacuation day. Japanese Americans were informed that they would be permitted to bring with them only as many belongings as they could carry and were instructed to use the following days to make final disposition of their belongings. Agents from the Farm Security Administration and other agencies were present to assist with storage and advise on disposition.[67]

Over a period of ninety days in the spring of 1942, 109,427 Japanese Americans were removed from the West Coast to assembly centers under military supervision. (In addition, 641 people—mostly Issei released from Justice Department internment camps and permitted to join their families—were transferred from elsewhere, and 151 people of Japanese ancestry were arrested and expelled from the Territory of Alaska).[68]

The removal process was repeated dozens of times. Japanese American residents of a district would be ordered to assemble at the control sta-

tion, generally at dawn. Their luggage was tagged with their family number, then placed in large piles loaded for transport. Often non-Japanese friends and neighbors came to see the evacuees off. Sometimes, volunteers from local groups or the Red Cross or the American Friends Service Committee provided refreshments; other times, the evacuees had nothing to eat. As Yuri Tateishi recalled:

> The day of the evacuation was April 26. The day before, we had to sleep on the floor because all the furniture was gone. . . . I recall we had to get up very early in the morning, and I think we all walked to the Japanese school because so one had a car then. And everybody was just all over the place, the whole Japanese community was there, the West L.A. community. The Westwood Methodist Church had some hot coffee and doughnuts for us that morning, which helped a lot, and we were loaded in a bus.[69]

A few Japanese Americans who owned cars drove to assembly centers in auto caravans under armed escort. The rest boarded buses and/or trains to their destinations. They were then sent to an assembly center on the West Coast (a few later departures went directly to a camp inland).[70]

By all accounts, even those written by critics of the government's policy, the army's action was handled with commendable swiftness, courtesy, and lack of deliberate cruelty. There was little or no violence against Japanese Americans by hostile civilians during evacuation (not least because Issei and Nisei were under armed guard), and the army worked well with the associated civilian agencies. Perhaps inevitably, though, there were horrors and humiliations stemming from the removal process. Paul Okimoto, sent to Santa Anita, as a child, recalled an interrupted farewell as Japanese Americans boarded trains:

> A young man embracing his girl friend was having a hard time saying goodbye to her. An MP guard shoved him away from the train as the train tooted its whistle, announcing its imminent departure. The man ran to the other side of the train to kiss her once more. An MP cocked his shotgun and ran after him. When the MP reached the young man, he clubbed him with his rifle butt. The young man was taken away with blood streaming down his face. I was shocked to see the blood, but relieved to see that he wasn't shot.[71]

THE ASSEMBLY CENTERS

Once they were rounded up and moved from their homes, the West Coast Japanese Americans were sent to a network of fifteen temporary facilities controlled by the army's Wartime Civil Control Administration, which the government termed "assembly centers." The assembly centers were Puyallup, Washington (dubbed "Camp Harmony" by the authorities); Portland, Oregon; Mayer, Arizona; and Santa Anita, Tanforan, Tulare, Turlock, Marysville, Merced, Pinedale, Pomona, Sacramento, Salinas, Stockton, and Fresno, California. These assembly centers, formed out of requisitioned racetracks and fairgrounds along the West Coast—such activities having been officially halted for the duration of the war—were designed by the WCCA to provide immediate mass confinement of evacuated Japanese Americans until permanent camps could be created inland. Meanwhile, with help from Nisei volunteer labor, the Army Corps of Engineers began constructing two larger centers, Manzanar and Poston, from the ground up.

Conditions at these centers were crowded and uncomfortable. Army workers hastily cleared and painted racetrack horse stalls and fairground livestock pens to make into barracks for the inmates. One inmate recalled, "The horse stalls had been whitewashed, but they still had straw and horsehair between the planks of the walls, and they maintained the smell of the animals throughout."[72] Another added, "We are infested with tiny fleas that bite like hell. They must be horse fleas or something that come from the old stables. Gods, they certainly make life miserable."[73] Meanwhile, shacks were constructed in infields and parking lots. Entire families were crowded into a single room, while single adults shared with strangers. The only furniture given the inmates upon arrival was a mattress cover, which they were assigned to fill with straw in order to make beds for themselves. As Miné Okubo, who was confined at Tanforan, recalled: "The mattress department was a stable filled with straw. We were given bags of ticking and told to help ourselves to the straw. The few cotton mattresses available were reserved for the sick and the old. When we had finished filling the bags, the openings were sewed roughly together and we carried the bags away."[74]

The army built group showers or used existing horse showers, and dug latrine pits for toilet facilities. The facilities at Santa Anita were located far from living quarters, had long lines of inmates waiting to use them, and

were uncomfortable. In the words of one inmate, the toilets were "10 seats lined up; hard, fresh-sawed, unsandpapered wood; automatic flushing every fifteen minutes."[75] While these were (officially) gender-segregated, they had no partitions or coverings for privacy, and shyer inmates would wait until late hours to visit them. Sanitation in all the camps was sufficiently poor, said a United States Health Service report, that epidemics were a constant threat.[76] The heat added to the toll, especially as summer dawned. As one inmate at Portland recalled, "Cool places were nonexistent in the crowded compound, and people were frequently fainting. Adding to the oppressive hot weather, I had vaccination fevers and frequent diarrhea."[77] Medical care was extremely primitive. The handful of Nisei doctors who worked overtime to care for the inmates were unequipped to deal with serious cases. The WCCA was slow to build hospitals, and it was difficult to get permission to take ill inmates to outside facilities in ambulances, especially on an emergency basis—confining the inmates was clearly more crucial in the eyes of administrators than preserving their health.[78] Restricted to a small space, the inmates also suffered from boredom, particularly those too young to take paid employment. Because Japanese Americans were removed from their homes toward the end of the school year, WCCA authorities did not plan schools for the young Nisei, although ultimately a few schools, staffed by Japanese American teachers, were formed. Recreational facilities were likewise limited, at least at first. However, with the help of YMCA and YWCA and other civic groups who donated ping-pong tables, playground equipment, and sporting goods, sports and play activities became more common (at Tanforan there was even fishing and toy sailboat racing on lakes), and inmates organized crafts classes, beauty contests, and music groups and dance bands.[79] Libraries were set up with assistance from outside librarians and Quaker and religious groups.[80] In some centers, limited self-government was established, with election of Relocatee Councils formed of inmates.

In addition to the hurried nature of their confinement, the privations Japanese Americans faced reflected the government's efforts to appease (or appeal to) anti-Japanese opinion and deflect accusations that the inmates were being "coddled."[81] Food supplies were poor in amount and quality. The WCCA ordered that expenditures on food be limited to 50 cents daily per inmate, and the actual food bill ranged from thirty-three to thirty-nine cents per day—a fraction of the amount offered soldiers. The inmates had to line up three times a day for meals, with long waits, and then line up a second time to clean their dishes. Inexperienced

cooks working with rationed materials on these tiny budgets produced food, such as Vienna sausages on rice, that ranged from inedible to uninspiring. Similarly, inmate wage scales were deliberately set below the rate of pay of army privates and ranged from eight dollars per month for unskilled jobs to sixteen dollars per month for professionals. Thousands of inmates were put to work on the camouflage-net factory set up at Santa Anita (Issei were later barred from such war production, since it violated the Geneva Convention), and a guayule (synthetic rubber) project was established at Manzanar. The dyes and chemicals from the net works caused numerous inmates to fall ill, and there was therefore accelerated worker turnover.[82]

WCCA center regulations imposed harsh restrictions on basic liberties. To begin with, the Japanese Americans were crowded into small areas surrounded by barbed wire and armed sentries. In Santa Anita, searchlights constantly swept up and down the "streets" (which had been named, in tongue-in-cheek fashion, for famous racehorses such as Man o' War) after dark and shined even on inmates visiting the bathroom.[83] Also, use of the Japanese language—the first language of many inmates, and in some cases their only language—was strictly banned in public meetings without the express consent of the administration. All writing in Japanese was forbidden, and Japanese-language books and other written materials were confiscated, except for dictionaries and Christian Bibles, which had to be officially checked for authenticity and approved. All center spaces, including "private" living areas, were subject to unannounced invasion by inspectors, who searched for contraband. Inmates were required to report for roll call each morning. Incoming mail was subject to opening and censorship. Officially endorsed mimeographed newspapers were founded in assembly centers in order to distribute news. However, all contents other than official bulletins had to be read and approved by the center's Public Relations Representative before publication would be permitted.[84] In sum, as a JACL inspection committee report stated of one center, "The entire atmosphere lends itself to that of a concentration camp or jail."[85]

Inmates struggled against the invasions of their rights. A group at Santa Anita, led by Kay Hirao, produced an illegal underground newsletter, "The Evacuee Speaks." To circumvent restraints on press freedom, Kiyoshi Conrad Hamanaka, editor of the Fresno *Grapevine*, smuggled stories that had been excised from the paper by censors to outside sympathizers for free distribution.[86] When a group at Santa Anita, led by Shuji Fujii (Kibei editor of the prewar left-wing newspaper *Doho*), circulated

petitions demanding that bans on Japanese language and on public assembly be lifted, they were arrested by center police.[87] On August 4, 1942, the center's direction at Santa Anita summarily forbade possession of the hot plates, which families had brought in under existing rules and had been using to heat formula for babies and food for sick people. Center police invaded the barracks to seize contraband. Mobs of young Nisei and mothers challenged the guards and drove them away from the living quarters by throwing rocks and bottles. Military police were then called upon to disperse the crowds, although no arrests were made. The riot succeeded in reversing the hot-plate ban and relaxing surveillance.[88]

Because Japanese American inmates were generally confined in the assembly centers for several months at most, there has been a tendency to overlook their role in shaping the Japanese American wartime experience. However, as scholars such as Noriko Shimada and Takeya Mizuno have pointed out, the assembly centers were key in establishing the essential psychology of Japanese Americans.[89] It was in the assembly centers that Japanese Americans first experienced confinement in an enclosed space surrounded by military guards, and the privations of life with poor food and inadequate medical care. There they were struck by the blows to their dignity and self-respect caused by living amid makeshift surroundings without privacy. According to many later testimonies, the fact that the inmates were housed in converted animal pens starkly revealed the government's view of them as subhuman. Similarly, it was in the assembly centers that the inmates first interacted with officialdom. The shifting and arbitrary nature of the regulations under which they were forced to live and the undercurrent of hostility they experienced from white guards and workers quickly led inmates to feel outrage and bitterness.

MASS EXPULSION IN CANADA

Even as Japanese Americans were removed from the West Coast during the spring of 1942, the signing of P.C. 1481 by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King gave rise to a parallel expulsion of 22,000 Japanese Canadians from their homes. To a certain extent, the Canadian government attacked the logistical question of removal with greater dispatch and precision than their American counterparts. Within ten days after the policy was announced, the cabinet created a new agency, the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC), to direct the emptying out of the coastal

districts and supervise the Japanese Canadians. Austin C. Taylor, a West Coast industrialist who had previously lobbied for removal of ethnic Japanese as a member of Vancouver's Citizens' Defense Committee, was named to chair the commission. Assistant Commander Frederick J. Mead of the RCMP and John Shirras of the B.C. provincial police were named as the BCSC's other members. The selection of civilians indicated that the military was not to participate at the highest level. At the same time, the makeup of the commission suggested that the government was primarily concerned with removing Japanese Canadians rather than attending to their needs, even though Taylor pronounced himself personally sympathetic to Issei and Nisei and expressed a wish to treat them as kindly as possible.[90] In a further sign of its distance from Japanese Canadians, the commission appointed as its sole Japanese community interlocutor a three-man liaison committee directed by Etsuji Morii, a rich underworld figure and owner of gambling houses. Although Morii enjoyed wide influence, he was widely despised among respectable members of the community as immoral and corrupt—one Nisei later complained that Morii's selection was akin to appointing Al Capone to represent Italian Americans. The appointment smacked of favoritism, especially when Issei who joined Morii's committee were exempted from immediate transportation to road labor camps. Eventually, the commission also appointed Nisei to balance the choice of Morii, but they were unable to exercise visible influence.[91]

The initial stages of relocation in Canada were carried out in more abrupt and significantly harsher fashion than in the United States, though not nearly as brutally as had been the imprisonment of ethnic Japanese in Australia and the South Pacific. As soon as it was created, the British Columbia Security Commission imposed an immediate curfew on all Japanese Canadians and proceeded to confiscate a list of contraband items, including radios, cameras, and guns. Letters to and from Japanese Canadians were censored, and their telephone conversations monitored. Most galling of all, Japanese Canadians were forbidden to make or buy liquor.[92]

Moving people out, however, posed a dilemma for officials in both Ottawa and Vancouver. The BCSC lacked resources, and the powerful Department of National Defense largely refused their assistance. A related problem was that, just as the mountain states had refused to permit Japanese American migrants to enter, leaders in the Canada's prairie provinces refused to permit Japanese Canadians from B.C. to resettle there

except under military supervision. Federal officials therefore decided to create road work camps for Japanese Canadians as the fastest means to get them away from the coast, as well as a way to use their labor to improve the inadequate road system. In accordance with the cabinet's original February 19 decision to open road labor camps where enemy aliens and "volunteer" citizens could work, the government established projects near Hope, Revelstroke, and Yellowhead, B.C, and Schreiber, Ontario, under the authority of the Department of Mines and Natural Resources. On February 23 the first trainloads carried into the wilderness 1,300 of the able-bodied male Japanese nationals who had been ordered excluded under the January 14, 1942, order-in-council. There they were assigned to clear brush or upgrade existing roads once the weather permitted. The BCSC (at Ottawa's direction) then ordered all other Japanese Canadian males between eighteen and forty-five to report as of March 9, so that they could be sent off in shifts to whichever road labor camp they had "volunteered" to staff.

By the end of May more than two thousand men, predominantly Issei but also Nisei, were at work on the road projects. Forcibly separated from their wives and families, they were put to labor for which often they had no experience, or they froze in the deep snow of a Canadian winter, unable to work. Since they had been removed before any facilities could be created for them, the men were housed in flimsy railroad boxcars while tents and shacks were constructed. Their pay averaged around fifty dollars per month, significantly lower than that of non-Japanese elsewhere with similar employment. Approximately half of this inadequate sum was then deducted for their room and board (as well as, for a time, unemployment insurance) and twenty dollars more was removed from the pay of married men for support of the families left behind.[93]

In March the government began implementing the summary expulsion of the remaining Japanese Canadians from the West Coast. Unlike in the United States, there were no community centers established to register people and advise them on what to take, and no pretense of assistance with settling their affairs. Instead, during these first weeks the government implemented plans to transport 2,500 rural Japanese to the city. On March 16 the first Issei and Nisei were taken away from their homes in the countryside. The RCMP invaded rural Japanese communities, sometimes in the early hours of the day, and residents were carted off without warning, carrying only a hastily packed suitcase or pillowcase. Japanese Canadians were forced to leave behind houses and belongings—even food

and dirty dishes. Once in custody, they were placed on trains, steamboats, and cars and carried to Vancouver. City residents remained at liberty in their homes, though subject to a strict curfew. Knowing they would soon be sent away, they struggled to sell of or dispose of their belongings. White scavengers and bargain hunters profited from their haste. On April 29 the Vancouverites were ordered to terminate their leases and prepare to move.[94]

To house the Japanese Canadians from outlying areas (and eventually the Vancouverites), the commission took over the Livestock Building and the Women's Building in Hastings Park (now the Pacific National Exhibition grounds) at Vancouver's eastern edge and rapidly reshaped the animal stalls to make holding pens for the Japanese Canadians until they could be shipped away from the coast. As the involuntary migrants arrived, they were placed in the holding pens, officially termed the Hastings Park Manning Pool, while the commission decided how to deploy them. Within a few months, the confined population was near four thousand women, children, and young men, and ultimately eight thousand passed through the cramped confines of the buildings. Conditions in Hastings Park were primitive and humiliating. The inmates were divided by sex, with men and boys housed separately from women and children. Packed in horse paddocks that still smelled of their former inhabitants—one inmate described "the pungent smell of animal urine and feces—some still sitting fresh in the stalls"[95]—they huddled together in the cold on rows of bunk beds covered by army blankets and straw mattresses. One inmate later recalled, "It was awful. Where the horses were, that's where they put us."[96] There were only three feet between each bunk, with no partitions, although inmates hung blankets in an attempt to secure privacy. At first the only toilets were old troughs, and there was no other running water for the inmates to wash or take baths, though ultimately a set of showers was rigged up. Food, provided by an outside firm, was dull and inadequate, reflecting the commission's limited budget, and dysentery and diarrhea were widespread. Menus improved after inmates launched a food strike on April 27. Meanwhile, a canteen and bake shop were set up to sell candy, soda, and bread to supplement the fare. Medical care was primitive, so much so that a system of passes was arranged to take away those with serious troubles to the hospital.[97] Bored inmates, with little in the way of recreational facilities, sat and talked or gambled to pass the time—so much so that one joke circulated that the bunks were separated only by individual crap games.[98]

Soon Japanese Canadians made efforts to improve conditions. Groups of volunteers signed up to help build more housing. One group formed the Hastings Park Japanese Committee to work with white social workers to ease conditions. Committee members visited families, organized gymnasiums and play areas, and arranged supplies of milk and cooking facilities for care of newborns. Until they, too, were taken from their homes, Vancouver-based groups did what they could to help the inmates. The staff of the *New Canadian* newspaper (which would soon move its offices and eventually leave the forbidden zone entirely) and the Japanese Canadian Citizen's Council (JCCC) attempted to intervene with the BCSC, but unlike the JACL they were unable to secure any official status or influence with the commission. Finally, with the aid of volunteer and haphazardly paid Nisei, a school was established in the hockey forum building and eventually attracted several hundred children, though it was difficult to arrange classes for a student population that was constantly arriving and departing.[99]

REACTIONS TO EXPULSION IN CANADA AND THE NISEI MASS EVACUATION GROUP

The first reports of mass removal were widely hailed in British Columbia, where anti-Japanese panic was at its height. While there continued various meetings of local whites pressing for action and urging that Japanese Canadians be removed permanently, the first signs of government roundups cheered the populace. An editorial in the *Vancouver Sun* expressed impatience to have the Pacific Coast cleared of all ethnic Japanese, and the editors stated their firm hope that it was "Saying goodbye, not au revoir" to the Japanese presence.[100] In response to such pressure, on March 27 further orders-in-council were passed. One granted the BCSC control over all Japanese Canadians removed from the West Coast, whether they migrated "voluntarily" or otherwise, and even after they resettled elsewhere. Another gave the custodian of enemy alien property the power to seize and dispose of any property belonging to an enemy alien. Unlike in the United States, this was quickly interpreted as referring not only to Japanese nationals, but also to naturalized Issei and native-born citizens. While these regulations were presented as a rational system for supervising the Japanese Canadians as they migrated and disposing of their property, their promulgation was designed to placate white racist opinion in

British Columbia by cutting the ties of the ethnic Japanese community to the coast and leaving them less reason to return. They would soon prove to have devastating consequences for the Japanese Canadians.

The Japanese Canadians, like their counterparts in the United States, were paralyzed with shock and outrage by the news of the orders expelling them from the only home they had ever known. "We are bitter," proclaimed the *New Canadian*, "with a bitterness we can never forget, which will mark us for the rest of our lives."[101] Takeo Nakano summed up his feelings in *tanka*:

> Against such a thing as tears
> Resolved
> When taking leave of home.
> Yet at that departure whistle,
> My eyes fill.[102]

Although leaders such as Kunio Shimizu of the JCCC and Thomas Shoyama, editor of the *New Canadian* (which continued publication in censored form), counseled Nisei to follow orders and make the best of a tragic situation, the harsh official actions soon sparked resistance. A particular source of anger was the daily calling up of detachments of naturalized Issei and Nisei men from Vancouver (both from Hastings Park and from the city at large) to be sent to road labor camps around Schreiber, northern Ontario. There was real fear that the men would freeze to death in the icy climate, and the threat of being buried in an avalanche was very real for those working in mountainous areas. Even worse was the prospect of families being divided. The Naturalized Japanese Canadian Association (NJCA), a group of Japanese-born Canadians, devised a plan for mass transportation of all Japanese Canadians, in family groups, to a single settlement on crown lands, where they could build their own loghouse settlements with materials provided by the government. The plan included detailed cost and time estimates. NJCA leaders called a meeting of community organizations on March 29. They unanimously approved the plan and asked that removal to road labor camps be suspended in order that it be considered.[103] However, BCSC Director Taylor refused to accept the proposal and warned that any Japanese Canadian who refused to report for the road labor camps faced a $4,500 fine and one year in prison.[104]

When JCCC leaders again called for cooperation, a group of fourteen Nisei and naturalized Issei, predominantly young husbands, broke off

unfit but deliberately worked slowly to prevent completion of a road that would be part of the war effort against their Japanese homeland.[111] It was then that Jintaro Charlie Tanaka, a naturalized Issei who had obtained a position as counsel to the Spanish consul, stepped in to propose a compromise. Young, single men would be assigned to staff the road labor camps, as long as older, married men could be permitted to rejoin their families and settle in communities established by the BCSC outside the West Coast. BCSC director Austin Taylor endorsed Tanaka's plan, but it took three further weeks and the ongoing strikes at road work camps to force Ottawa to consent to negotiations with representatives of the resisters. Finally, in early July, agreement was reached.[112] Married men began to leave the road labor camps, and soon barely 500 workers, generally single men, remained.[113] It would not be so simple to undo the damage done to the resisters. Even though the issue over which they had protested had been resolved, the 758 Nisei "troublemakers" who had been interned as prisoners of war were not permitted to join their families in the "interior settlements." Many of them were incarcerated for the rest of the war, first at Petawawa, later at Angler, Ontario.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MASS CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

While the Japanese Americans were removed and confined in assembly centers, the War Relocation Authority prepared their transfer inland. As soon as the WRA was established in March 1942, Director Milton Eisenhower journeyed to San Francisco to meet with army and civilian officials there. Eisenhower's original plan was to arrange for the orderly individual release of the Japanese Americans once they were removed, and then their progressive resettlement and absorption by communities outside the West Coast. On April 7, 1942, he met with a group of western governors and state officials during their conference in Salt Lake City. All the governors present, led by Utah Governor Herbert Maw, warned Eisenhower of widespread anti-Japanese sentiment in their states. They refused to accept any Japanese American migrants, except under armed guard, and warned of widespread bloodshed if Japanese Americans were freed or resettlement attempted.[114]

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Shocked by the resistance, Eisenhower changed course and proposed that Japanese Americans be removed to the interior of the country and placed in "war-length" confinement centers where they could be "protected" by the federal government.[115] He likewise refused requests for transportation of Japanese American farm labor to fill shortages. He admitted that the army had raised no objection to private employment, assuming that state governments were prepared to assure transportation and protection for the workers and to pay a prevailing wage. However, he insisted that "a wide dispersal" of workers might lead to trouble, and he declined to grant permission for the transfers. The WRA soon began scouting out locations for camps, using the guidelines developed in connection with the army. Although the camps were consciously designed for keeping inmates in long-term custody, the War Department and the WRA swiftly agreed that the phrase "concentration camps" would be strictly forbidden as too negative (and embarrassing) and agreed instead to refer to these facilities by the euphemism "reception centers" or "relocation centers." Meanwhile, to evade the implications of detaining American citizens, the army coined the official term "nonaliens" to describe the Nisei's status.

This policy shift did not take place without a certain awkwardness and denial within government circles. Mass incarceration of citizens was likely unconstitutional, as a legal opinion issued by the Interior Department's solicitor soon afterward contended:

> It is doubtful whether [Executive Order 9066 and consequent proclamations] furnish a legal basis for the involuntary retention of Japanese within relocation areas situated inside or outside the West Coast military area. . . . If it is thus concluded and demonstrated by the very acts of the military authorities that no danger attaches to the presence of large of West Coast Japanese outside military areas, the retention of other West Coast Japanese within relocation areas situated outside the West Coast military area would constitute *a clear and unjustifiable discrimination.*[116]

WRA Solicitor Philip Glick emphasized the feeling of government illegality when he told a meeting at the agency's Washington office in the summer of 1942, "Many of the members of the WRA staff are walking around these days with heavy constitutional consciences."[117] However, the bureaucrats could devise no better means for protecting Japanese Americans while inspiring a sense of security among the public.

President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stimson, when consulted on the new policy, readily approved it. Rather than formally suspending ha-

beas corpus or altering the legal authority that the WRA already enjoyed in order to make possible the indefinite confinement of citizens, the White House decided to designate the camps as defense areas within the purview of military authority and continue to hold Nisei under Executive Order 9066. Yet they too were aware that the policy had taken on a life of its own, distinct from its (ostensible) origins in regard to national security. When Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King met Roosevelt for a Pacific War Council in late June, FDR told him that he did not believe seriously that any Japanese attack on the Pacific Coast was plausible.[118] Two weeks later, Stimson was alarmed by a report from General DeWitt that Governor Culbert Olson of California wished to keep Japanese Americans in assembly centers so that they could be brought in for labor on the fall harvest. In a letter to the president in which he referred sarcastically to Olson as "that great patriot," Stimson complained bitterly that Californians, having rushed madly to get "the poor Japs" out of their state, now wanted to keep them further for their own convenience. Stimson stated instead that permanent relocation of Japanese Americans away from the coast should proceed, as it would represent "the permanent settlement of a great national problem."[119] As Stimson remarked to a critic of the government policy who urged individual hearings, "The evacuation once accomplished is not easily undone."[120]

In June 1942 Milton Eisenhower resigned as WRA director. He later stated that the pressure of the job and the gravity of the injustice of confining innocent Japanese Americans preyed on his conscience. In his farewell report to the president (and simultaneously in testimony before Congress), Eisenhower expressed his personal judgment that the Nisei were "80 to 85 percent loyal" and that the majority of Issei were at least "passively loyal." Nevertheless, Eisenhower recommended that the Japanese Americans be confined for the remainder of the war, then be divided up, with the pro-Japanese being sent to Japan, and the pro-American being aided to re-enter the larger society.[121] There was a moment of contention over who would be named the new WRA director. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes nominated his deputy, Indian Affairs Director John Collier. Clark Foreman, a liberal southerner and former director of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, obtained Mrs. Roosevelt's endorsement for his candidacy.[122] However, on Eisenhower's recommendation, backed by Budget Director Harold Smith, the post fell to Dillon Myer, another Agriculture Department specialist (one less visibly disturbed by the assignment than his predecessor).[123] Myer would be responsible for establishing WRA policy as the Japanese Americans were moved into the camps. He remained WRA director, despite continual sniping from anti-Japanese American forces, for the remainder of the agency's existence.

THE JOURNEY EAST

Starting in mid-1942, as the War Relocation Authority oversaw the construction of more permanent camps inland, the 110,000 Japanese Americans in the WCCA's assembly centers gradually began to be transferred to WRA camps. Those confined at Manzanar did not have to move since it passed directly from WCCA control to that of the WRA. Otherwise, a WRA camp was generally designated to correspond to each assembly center—Topaz for Tanforan inmates, Minidoka for Puyallup, etc.—so most of those who had been in the same Assembly Center found themselves in the same WRA camp as well. However, because there were more assembly centers than camps, contingents of people from different regions and backgrounds were thrown together in the camps.

For most Japanese Americans, the journey from assembly center to camp was a multiday cross-country train trip. (According to Motumu Akashi, then a young boy, one Nisei wit dubbed the train transporting them "the Orient express.")[124] Once transfer began, trainloads of several hundred inmates would leave each night, often in the midnight hours. These voyages were long and exhausting—especially for the 20,000-odd inmates being sent to the WRA's two camps in Arkansas. They were crowded together in the railroad cars, which were mostly antiquated parlor cars pressed into service, with old-fashioned fittings and velvet seats. The Japanese Americans sat on straight-backed seats beside closed windows with drawn curtains—army officers were afraid that if whites along the trains' route could see the travelers, they would throw stones at the trains. In the summer heat, the air in the closed railway cars was stifling. There were no sleeping facilities, and armed military guards watched over the involuntary passengers constantly to prevent escape. Only when the train stopped at stations could they emerge, in groups under guard, to go to the bathroom. Once the trainloads of Japanese Americans finally arrived at their destination, requisitioned buses took them the rest of the short distance behind the gates of the camps established to hold them.

The migrating Japanese population moving east was topped off by the arrival of the 1,037 Japanese American "voluntary evacuees" who arrived

in successive shiploads from Hawaii. These people were primarily Issei who had been interned on the islands, plus their families.[125] Meanwhile, several hundred Japanese Americans who had not been sent to the assembly centers (mainly those in the eastern California section of Military Area 2) were rounded up by the army and prepared for removal directly to the WRA camps.

THE DISPERSION OF THE CANADIAN JAPANESE

Even as it responded to the challenge of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, the BCSC looked for ways to move Japanese Canadians away from the coast. The Alberta Sugar Beet Association offered some assistance. Desperate for workers, on March 31 its lobbyists had asked Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell to send them Japanese to cultivate sugar beets. With the approval of the commission, representatives of the association traveled to Vancouver to recruit inmate labor. The commission announced specifications for employment, including housing with adequate furniture, stoves with wood or coal for heating, and clean drinking water, but had no power to enforce them. Nevertheless, since sugar beet farming guaranteed that families would not be separated, there was a rush among Issei and Nisei to sign up for farm labor. By June 25 some 3,879 people had left for sugar beet farms in Alberta, Manitoba, and southwestern Ontario. Alberta's government objected to the "importation" of the Japanese workers. As a result, in May 1942 , the federal government signed a written agreement saying that it would be responsible for all the workers' health and education costs and would guarantee they would leave the province after the end of the war. (A similar agreement was rapidly concluded with Ontario, and with Manitoba's government a month later). Issei and Nisei would remain in the three provinces as an exploited source of labor, sheltered in often substandard shacks and put to long hours of backbreaking work without overtime pay. Japanese Canadian workers employed by unscrupulous sugar beet growers were hobbled in their struggle for better conditions by legal restrictions on their movement. Even after appeals to the BCSC led to regulations permitting them to change employers, widespread prejudice limited their options—particularly in Alberta, whose three largest cities voted ordinances banning Japanese Canadians from settling there.[126]

Meanwhile, in part through the brokering of Etsuji Morii (who left Vancouver in April for such a place himself), groups of Issei and Nisei were invited by the BCSC to move on a "self-supporting" basis to places in eastern British Columbia, including Christina Lake, Bridge River, Minto City, Lillooet, and McGillvray Falls. Some 1,150 Japanese Canadians—generally those with more means—agreed to assume full responsibility for all the expenses of their moving, housing, and living. Taking their families and household possessions, they chartered trains and traveled to the "self-supporting sites." Although forbidden to buy property, they established themselves on farmland leased from the government or private sources (or held in the name of non-Japanese associates). At the same time, those Japanese Canadians who had family or other sponsors for employment outside the West Coast were encouraged to apply to BCSC for special permits to accept approved employment. Approximately 1,350 did so in the following months, most to take farm labor in eastern British Columbia or Ontario.[127] Several dozen Nisei women relocated to cities such as London, Ontario, Toronto, and Montreal, where they were assigned jobs as domestic laborers, helping ease wartime shortages.

Nevertheless, the majority of Japanese Canadians were forced into concentration camps, known as "interior housing," in former mining settlements in eastern British Columbia's Slocan Valley. The BCSC decided on this location because there was abandoned housing available, from the days when these had been "boom towns," and they hoped that Japanese Canadian settlement could revive the economy of the desolate region. The last Japanese inmate left Hastings Park on September 30, and the Pacific Coast was officially closed to Issei and Nisei, apart from a few hospital patients, plus approximately one hundred ethnic Japanese in mixed marriages and their children. Unlike in the United States, spouses of whites were exempted from removal irrespective of gender, but spouses of non-whites (i.e., Chinese) or immigrants were not exempted.[128]

THE REMOVAL OF JAPANESE IN MEXICO

As mentioned, the outbreak of war in the Pacific led numerous Latin American nations to declare war on Japan. The extent to which their leaders had their eyes on Washington can be inferred from their coordination of policy regarding people of Japanese ancestry. Brazil, which had the hemisphere's

largest Japanese population, resisted all cooperation with the United States. Conversely, the closest Latin American nation, Mexico, was among the first to take arbitrary action against citizens and residents of Japanese ancestry, albeit on an independent basis. Mexico had been a choice spot for Japanese immigration during the early part of the century—thousands of laborers were recruited for work on coffee plantations in the southern states of Oaxaca and Chiapas. As the work dried up and they completed their contracts, many of them migrated north to work in sugar plantations or coal mines—some of them hoping to pass illegally from Mexico into California. In the 1920s, after the end of the Mexican Revolution, vibrant communities of cotton farmers, fishermen, small merchants, and gamblers established themselves in Mexico's northern regions of Baja California, Sonora, and Sinaloa, while smaller communities emerged in Guadalajara and Tampico. Immigrants in Tijuana operated restaurants, opened businesses, and bought land. Nearly a thousand ethnic Japanese, mainly professionals and traders, admitted under a special 1927 immigration law, took residence in the Mexico City area.[129] During the 1930s the position of Japanese residents of Mexico became increasingly difficult. Fishermen were hindered by discriminatory state and local regulations, Japanese farmers in Mexicali were evicted after the government seized 10,000 acres of land in 1937, and Issei and Nisei in the capital experienced job discrimination. Their presence was also made uneasy by efforts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to recruit them for intelligence networks.[130]

The coming of war between the United States and Japan led to harsh official action by Mexico against its residents of Japanese ancestry. In mid-1941 Mexico's government banned export of strategic goods to Japan, and it broke off diplomatic relations with Tokyo after Pearl Harbor (although Mexico did not officially declare war until May 1942), at which time it froze all bank accounts of Japanese nationals and imposed travel restrictions. West Coast Mexican elites and nationalists soon showed signs of the same sort of fears about Japanese invasion, and local Japanese subversion, as their Anglo neighbors. At the beginning of 1942, for example, the executive committee of the Union of Mexican railroad workers in the western part of the country submitted a written report containing purported plans, based on "trustworthy information," for an upcoming Japanese raid against Mexico, to be made in conjunction with action by ethnic Japanese fifth columnists. "The activities of fifth columnists will be to blow up bridges and destroy roads, to prevent help from arriving from the United States." The document urged the concentration of all Germans, Italians, and Japanese living in the western part of the country into camps to be established in Yucatan or near the American border, where they could be closely watched.[131] Meanwhile, in mid-February Colonel Loaixa, governor of Sinaloa, insisted that Japanese agents, acting in the guise of simple fisherman, had mined Mexico's territorial waters. Although this was hotly denied by General Garay, the Mexican Army's chief of staff, it contributed to the larger belief that Japan was organizing an invasion of Mexico preparatory to a direct attack on the United States.[132]

In response to the pressure—and with the approval, if not the direction, of Washington—the Mexican government felt obliged to take drastic action.[133] Over the first weeks of 1942, raids were carried out on Japanese communities in Mexico City. Numerous Issei were arrested without charge and sent to an internment camp at Perote. Meanwhile, on January 2, 1942, the government ordered all residents of Japanese ancestry in Baja California to leave the state. Some 2,800 Mexican Japanese, including the bulk of the remaining landowners in the Mexicali region, were forced to fill out "voluntary relocation applications" and move at least a hundred miles from the coastal and border areas at their own expense. They were given barely ten days to settle their affairs—only a few of their Mexican wives and mixed-race children were permitted to stay. Their fishing boats and farms, including the rich cotton plantations, were taken over by local Mexicans, with no official compensation offered.[134]

Most of the refugees took the long slow journey from the coast—a five-day trip—and settled in the capital district or in Guadalajara. Soon, more immigrants and their children, chased out of Sonora by government authorities, came to join them, and in early March the area around Manzanillo, in the state of Colima, was emptied of Japanese. Ultimately as much as 80 percent of the Mexican Japanese population was uprooted. As one refugee recalled:

> My family, plus five or six other families, put together their resources and hired a truck and a driver to take us all the way to Mexico City. . . . In retrospect, we must have looked like cattle in back of that truck. We ate and slept aboard the truck most of the time in order to save time and money. Upon our arrival in Mexico City, we stayed at what I would like to refer to as the "clearing house." New arrivals were allowed to stay there for a short time. The men went out daily job-hunting, but jobs were scarce. At night, this place was "carpeted" wall-to-wall with people sleeping on the floor.[135]

Members of the existing Japanese community in Mexico City, who were less affected by the official actions, transformed the defunct Japanese consulate and Japanese Associations into a "Co-Prosperity Society" (Kyoekai), which worked to aid the distressed migrants, as well as locals fired from factory jobs. Some 350 people were established on a ranch in Batan donated by a community member. Another 500 people, who had no other means, were sent to a refugee camp in Temixco established by order of President Miguel Avila Camacho, where they grew crops to feed themselves.[136] Most of the refugees were able after a period of time to find housing and some sort of employment, and they were later permitted to open Japanese schools for their children, but they lived in privation, with no government assistance and limited aid from the Kyoekai.

INTERNMENT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN JAPANESE

The Mexican government's arbitrary removal and internal exile of its ethnic Japanese residents was mirrored in the experience of the "Latin American Japanese" who were taken and deported to the United States during the war. This hemispheric prisoner exchange program had its origins in the late 1930s, at which time Washington grew concerned for the security of Latin America, which it considered a "soft underbelly" for Axis penetration.[137] The approach of war heightened these fears. In April 1941 President Roosevelt proposed that Japanese residents on Latin America's Pacific coast be interned in case of war on bases in the Galapagos Islands.[138] In a speech in October 1941, he charged that U.S. agents had obtained a "secret map" showing plans for Nazi conquest of South America and division of territories.[139] A central focus of concern was the defense of the American-controlled Panama Canal and the surrounding Canal Zone from sabotage in case of war. In a national radio address in September 1941, Roosevelt accused the Nazis of preparing "footholds and bridgeheads in the New World," including building air bases in Colombia within range of the Panama Canal.[140] In November 1941, hoping to drive Japanese residents away from the Canal Zone region, Panama passed a law forbidding all Asians from engaging in or continuing commerce, and seized the businesses of local Japanese.[141] At the same time, American diplomats orally agreed with Panamanian officials that if war broke out, all Japanese aliens in Panama would be rounded up and interned. As mentioned, in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack

Panamanian police proceeded to round up all 171 Japanese residents, using funds provided by the U.S. War Department, and they opened a camp.[142]

Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. secretary of state and the foreign ministers of six Latin American republics met at Rio de Janeiro and established an Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. The committee recommended the detention and expulsion of all "dangerous" Axis nationals in the region and pressured the remaining Latin American nations to embargo all Japanese-owned businesses on the State Department's Proclaimed List of Blocked Nationals and to control Japanese residents.[143] The Latin American governments initially resisted, claiming that they lacked the resources to establish efficient security programs and house internees. The State Department offered to finance construction of internment camps, based on the Panamanian precedent, or make its own detention facilities available.[144] One such camp, built to hold German and Japanese aliens, was opened at the Isle of Pines, Cuba, in April 1942.[145] State Department officials soon complained that German aliens were bribing jailers to release them and decided that it was safer and more efficient to take custody of internees and bring them north than to operate individual camps scattered through Latin America.[146] Ultimately, twelve Latin American countries received assistance from the United States in deporting German or Japanese enemy aliens. State Department authorities agreed to take all those whoever the Latin Americans claimed represented a danger. The Japanese Latin Americans were arrested by local police and deported without any hearings or due process. They were placed on U.S. military transports, guarded by American soldiers, then sent first to a temporary camp in Panama, where they were stripped of their passports. They then were moved on to the United States. Lacking any substantive legal basis on which to hold these involuntary entrants (except arguably a 1798 act that allowed custody of dangerous enemy aliens but had never before been enforced), the government devised a plan to charge them with entering the country illegally. Edward Ennis, director of the Justice Department's Alien Enemy Control Unit, later stated that "in March or April 1942" the State Department had asked the attorney general to take temporary custody of Latin American "alien enemies" pending their repatriation to German, Italy, and Japan.[147] The Justice Department placed them in internment in the "family internment center" at Crystal City, Texas, a camp run by the Justice Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although the State Department, for its part, instituted the intern-ment program in the interests of hemispheric security, and originally intended to take custody only of German aliens, its purpose gradually shifted. As Japan conquered large areas of Asia and the western Pacific during early 1942 and diplomats grew aware of the extent of the American population under Tokyo's control, they became interested in prisoner exchanges. However, the massive refusal of Japanese soldiers on battlefields to surrender as dishonorable meant that the number of Japanese POWs available for exchange was small. It was then that the idea of using Latin American Japanese, especially those who had requested repatriation to Japan, as prisoners for exchange took hold.[148] Using the Swiss and Spanish governments as conduits, the State Department negotiated a series of prisoner exchanges, which resulted in the repatriation of Japanese diplomats and private citizens whose return was demanded by Tokyo, in exchange for American citizens. By August 1942 the United States had sent off 1,100 Japanese nationals to Japan, and in December Army Chief of Staff George Marshall called for the deportation to the United States of 1,000 more Latin American Japanese (plus 250 Germans) to use as exchange for American civilians interned by Axis nations.[149] The exchange process, however, proved cumbersome. The United States was limited in the resources available for shipping and internment of Latin American Japanese, and Japan insisted on selecting the individuals it would accept. After September 1943 exchange ship voyages were halted entirely because Japan refused to assure safe passage for repatriates in a war zone.[150] Still, the desire to effect further trades led the State Department to continue accepting Japanese Latin Americans. Indeed, as a result of its interest, the State Department not only confined Japanese diplomats and repatriates from Latin American nations but became complicit in their deportation of private individuals, even citizens. As Edward Ennis put it, many of those taken "were not security problems but the police authorities of our good neighbor nations took the opportunity to get rid of them for their own reasons."[151]

The chief culprit was Peru, whose government ultimately provided some 80 percent of those deported. The Peruvian government had a particular self-interest in getting rid of ethnic Japanese. Thousands of Japanese had come to Peru as temporary workers in the early twentieth century, notably after the cutoff of immigration to North America in the 1920s, and had remained as settlers after their labor contracts terminated. Peruvians had grown increasingly hostile toward the newcomers, many

of whom stayed in closed Japanese social and religious groupings and refused to learn Spanish or take Peruvian citizenship. The economic success of the Japanese bred envy and resentment by local competitors, especially during the Great Depression. The government responded to its citizens' complaints in the late 1930s by enacting harsh legislation cutting off immigration and limiting access to citizenship for Peru's 20,000–25,000 Japanese residents, even the native-born.[152] In May 1940 tensions fanned by nationalist politicians and unscrupulous journalists boiled over into two days of anti-Japanese rioting in Lima. Issei-owned business were pillaged and destroyed, and hundreds of Issei and Nisei were left penniless.

With the coming of war (although Peru remained formally neutral until 1945), existing resentment of ethnic Japanese flared up once more, buttressing popular anti-Japanese measures. All Japanese-owned properties of any size, including five Japanese schools, were confiscated. Even as Peruvian government officials discussed means of expelling all residents of Japanese ancestry, Peruvian Japanese were ordered to leave the Pacific coast and remove to the interior. Some five hundred Japanese aliens signed up with the Spanish Embassy to request repatriation to Japan.[153] Thus, when the United States offered Peru the chance to turn over Japanese diplomatic officials and Axis nationals whom it regarded as "dangerous," the Peruvians were quick to take advantage. In early 1942 the Americans accepted responsibility for the five hundred repatriates, plus Japanese diplomatic and consular officials. Meanwhile, diplomat John Emmerson began working with Peruvian officials to produce lists of "dangerous" aliens and their families for deportation. Emmerson's efforts notwithstanding, the Americans lacked facilities for verifying whether those on the lists in fact posed any threat, and thus assigned priority on the basis of an individual's community leadership or influence. Peruvian officials motivated by greed or racial hostility, using distorted or invented intelligence, haphazardly listed Japanese as "dangerous" (or were inspired by bribes to protect others in similar categories by accepting poorer residents as proxies). Emmerson himself later confessed that during his time in Peru, he had found no reliable evidence of any planned subversion.

As the deportees arrived in the United States and were confined in Crystal City, they were examined by Justice Department officials, who registered objections to the wholesale shipments of internees who did not appear dangerous and refused to continue involuntary internment of internees without specific proof of danger. The State Department objected, on the grounds that it could not violate abrogate a deal made with

the government of a sovereign state at the request of an agency that had no role in foreign policy. After several months of debate, the Justice Department finally stated that it would have nothing further to do with the program. The State Department then proposed that the Justice Department assist in selection of internees. Thus, in January 1943 the Justice Department sent Raymond Ickes (brother of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes) to South America to help assure a smaller and fairer process. Ickes condemned Peruvians for sending "lots of Japanese to the States merely because Peruvians wanted their businesses and not because there is any evidence against them."[154] Nevertheless, he was unable to persuade the American Embassy to suspend the program, and the deportations continued through late 1944, by which time 2,264 Issei and Nisei had been transported and interned.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor mobilized or rationalized anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the Pacific Rim. Despite the lack of hard evidence linking Issei and Nisei with any disloyal conduct, they became handy stand-ins for the Japanese enemy in the public mind. The resulting suspicion of people of Japanese ancestry, which drew on pre-existing social and economic hostility toward them as a minority group and was further inflamed by the efforts of nativist and commercial interest groups, manifested itself in popular pressure for their removal from coastal areas and seizure of their property.

Yet if the demands for mass action were founded in popular opinion, the enabling force behind mass exclusion throughout the Americas was the U.S. government and its agencies. Besides confining 110,000 of its own citizens and long-term residents, many times the combined figure for all the other countries, the Americans pressured Latin American governments to control their ethnic Japanese populations. At the same time, anti-Japanese forces in Canada and Mexico buttressed the case for removal by appealing to solidarity with the United States and coordination of defense policy, and the Peruvians made use of Yankee concerns over security to banish individuals whose success had aroused resentment. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the U.S. government was less harsh and punitive in its policies than the others. While Canada and Mexico ordered Japanese residents from the coast in hurried and arbitrary fashion, the United

States attempted to develop orderly procedures for evacuating Issei and Nisei. Similarly, while the measures taken by Washington, D.C., to protect the property of those it took from their homes were inadequate and led to considerable losses, at least the Americans did not appropriate or confiscate their possessions. Unlike the other governments, the U.S. government paid the expenses of confinement. Japanese Canadians at Hastings Park envied their American counterparts, who were migrating in intact family groups to facilities constructed by a federal agency for their use. Under the banner of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, they organized a widespread protest campaign, and suffered punishment, simply in order to obtain the government's pledge to allow them similar treatment.

The only area with a sizable ethnic Japanese population that escaped mass removal was Hawaii. In that case, it may well have been the large local Japanese population that played a decisive role in stalling the policy. Whereas ethnic Japanese elsewhere were a small and isolated minority whose racial difference and economic success made them easy targets for reprisal, Japanese in Hawaii were almost 40 percent of the territory's population, and they formed the backbone of the its workforce. Nisei were a central group in the islands' society and had existing relations with other groups. Thus, while some voices, mainly outsiders or newcomers to Hawaii, called for mass removal of the local Japanese, the territory's established white leadership was anxious to retain them. Furthermore, the unusual power granted the military as part of martial law both reassured those charged with territorial defense, notably Commanding General Emmons, and made it possible for him to deflect the strongly expressed will of President Roosevelt and Navy Secretary Knox that Japanese must be removed. The trust that Emmons and his associates offered the local Japanese was amply rewarded. They made impressive contributions to the war effort, through both military service and patriotic efforts on the home front. At the same time, as we shall see, the military did not scruple to make use of the presence of the local Japanese in more negative ways, to maintain control of the territory in the face of demands by civilian governors.

Group supported remaining in Canada, but even they were split over whether to accept immediate employment outside camp and send for families, or to remain inside to protest the undemocratic treatment they had received. In the end, some 430 of the original 750 internees remained in Angler through the end of the war.

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CAMPS

The ethnic Japanese aliens held in custody by the U.S. government during the war were housed in a network of camps managed in cooperation with the War Department by the Justice Department's Enemy Alien Control Division, in part using facilities maintained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Since the internees were frequently shuttled from place to place with no evident pattern, it is difficult to generalize about their experience. As mentioned, mainland Issei detained after Pearl Harbor were held in stations run by the INS throughout the nation. Ironically, the immigration station at Ellis Island, New York, past symbol of welcome to immigrants, became a holding center for aliens taken into custody on the East Coast. Groups of Issei arrested on the West Coast during early 1942 were sent to a camp at Santa Fe, New Mexico. Others were sent to a camp at Kenedy, Texas. Meanwhile, the Justice Department held a handful of Issei women in a camp at Seagoville, Texas. A group of thirty-two Issei and Nisei from the town of Clovis, New Mexico, were arrested after Pearl Harbor and held—the citizens quite illegally—at Old Raton ranch, an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp in New Mexico.[130] By April 1942 about a thousand Issei, as well as German and Italian nationals, had been detained by the army at Fort Missoula, Montana. Another thousand were held at Fort Abraham Lincoln, near Bismarck, North Dakota.

It was during their initial confinement that these arrested enemy aliens (Japanese as well as German and Italian) were granted hearings by hearing boards assembled for the purpose. During these hearings, they were forbidden to have attorneys or to testify other than by answering questions, but they were permitted to present evidence to prove their loyalty—including witnesses, if available. If, as in most cases, the hearing boards determined that the aliens did not pose a threat, they were released—however, unlike German and Italian aliens, who were liberated entirely from custody, released Japanese aliens were sent to join their

families in the WRA camps. Those aliens whom the boards deemed dangerous were scheduled for long-term internment. In some cases, they remained at their initial detention centers, while others were moved. (Santa Fe was emptied of its Japanese alien population, only to be mobilized subsequently to house renunciants from Tule Lake and their families who were being deported to Japan.) Army-run camps at Fort Livingston, Louisiana, and Lordsburg, New Mexico, were created to house this overflow. The migration was marked by tragedy: on July 27, 1942, as a trainload of Issei arrived at Lordsburg and were marched into camp, two men too ill to walk were shot to death by a sentry under suspicious circumstances.

By April 1943, a total of 5,166 Japanese aliens in Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S mainland (plus 477 U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry) had been arrested, of whom some 2,980 were still being held or interned.[131] Lordsburg itself held up to 2,500 internees at one point, before they were again dispersed. As mentioned, conditions in the camps differed—Lordsburg was in a mountainous desert region, while Fort Livingston was in a swamplike area—but their facilities were similar and indeed bore a general resemblance to those at the Canadian POW camps at Petawawa and Angler. The army camps were made up of barracks surrounded by barbed wire and sentries. Each included gardens for growing food, recreational centers, and sports activities—army engineers built an athletic field for the inmates at Lordsburg. Mail was censored and visitors forbidden, apart from the official visits of the Spanish consul. However, most of the cooking and other internal tasks in the American camps were assigned to the prisoners themselves. As in the case of the Japanese Canadians at Angler, there was some uncertainty over the status of the internees under the Geneva Convention, and disputes broke out when prisoners at Camp Livingston resisted administration orders to chop wood for fuel without pay. Unlike in Ontario, however, the U.S. internees accepted a compromise under which they agreed to chop wood, but for their exclusive use.[132] In 1943 the INS took over an old CCC camp on the Lochsa River in Idaho, which had been run as part of the federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, and renamed it the Kooskia Internment Camp. The INS recruited Japanese aliens from the larger internment camps to do paid road labor extending the Lewis and Clark Highway.[133]

Beginning in early 1943, the army and the Justice Department devised a new policy, by which Issei men in custody could be joined by their families from the WRA camps. The installation at Crystal City, Texas, was designated as the family internment center. Beginning in March 1943,

families who accepted "voluntary internment" alongside their fathers were brought into the camp and thrown together with German alien internees and their German American families, plus the shiploads of ethnic Japanese and German Latin Americans who had already been placed there. Because of the presence of family groups, Crystal City's structure was unique among the internment camps. Families were housed in various kinds of individual residences—Japanese were generally placed in wooden cabins dubbed "victory huts"—with iceboxes and running water. Food rations were provided, including a daily milk ration delivered for children, plus medical care.[134] A central commissary was set up, as were community washrooms and showers.[135] Each adult was given a set of chores to perform, such as gardening or delivering ice, and could volunteer for additional work as well at a rate of eighty cents per day.

Daily life in Crystal City was much like that in the WRA centers. Internees struggled against boredom, psychological trauma, and internal discord. However, unlike in most other camps, Japanese Americans were not held in isolation but had contact with other groups who were also confined. Most distinctive was the network of schools set up to educate several hundred children. Because of the separate interests of internee groups, which reflected a diversity of attitudes toward the U.S. government and American culture as well as the internees' predicted postwar needs, diverse programs were established.[136] For example, almost all the ethnic German parents, disillusioned with the United States by their internment and subjected to pressure by pro-Nazi internees, sent their children to a German-style school. The Latin American Japanese children, who spoke little English and whose families could logically expect postwar deportation, were sent to a Japanese school, as were some Nisei from Hawaii who had attended prewar Japanese schools. The curriculum of the school, following Japanese models, featured not only academic subjects but also flower arranging and etiquette classes. Japanese educators emphasized honor and loyalty through martial arts, *sushin* (ethics) courses, and patriotic festivals such as the emperor's birthday. Mainland Nisei children, plus a few German children, attended an American-style public school run by white teachers from the local community. It inculcated democratic values and encouraged Nisei children to develop and express their citizenship. The school's mission and activities, notably its holding of a high school prom, led to angry protest from partisans of Japanese ancestral customs, and to divisions within the community.[137]

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to speak in general terms of the enormous and bewildering variety of camps established by the American and Canadian governments during the war to hold different classes and nationalities of ethnic Japanese, and of the treatment of the people in them. Many of the arrangements were improvised and haphazard. The legal regimes and authority under which they operated were also in many instances confused. The Issei, as foreign nationals, were able to claim the minimum standards and protections of the Geneva Convention. Ironically, the protections were applied more strictly to those confined in internment camps, who otherwise faced the most stringent restrictions on their liberties, than to those in the WRA camps or the Canadian ghost towns, who had not been deemed to represent an individual danger. More paradoxically still, because the arbitrary treatment of citizens was such a largely unprecedented—and constitutionally contradictory—phenomenon, the Nisei could claim no similar protections under the Geneva Convention or other act of international law.

The comparison between the experience of Japanese Canadians in the ghost towns and that of the Japanese Americans held by the WRA is nonetheless illuminating. In most respects, the Canadians faced far harsher conditions. They faced a more extreme climate, had less choice of jobs, and were more isolated from the outside world. Most importantly, Canada's government provided only a fraction of the funding that the Americans did—about one-third, according to one estimate on a per inmate basis—and Japanese Canadians were required to eke out an existence largely on their own funds. The publicly funded mess halls, clothing allowances, high schools, music and crafts programs, and consumer cooperatives operated by the American government had no counterpart in Canada. The structures put in place by the WRA to provide practical and financial assistance to resettlers, especially college students, and to advocate for them in their new homes were not copied by the Canadians, who developed a coercive resettlement program and refused to grant business licenses and residence permits. Furthermore, while Japanese Americans lost the lion's share of their property during removal and afterward, the outright confiscation of Japanese Canadian properties, and the dissipation of their assets in forced sales, were so glaringly unjust as to arouse anger and opposition from whites as well as Issei and Nisei.

Still, what is most telling is the overall identity of the camp experience, irrespective of material conditions. The same signs of apathy and family breakdown appeared among Issei and Nisei on both sides of the border, and similar doubts about resettlement were expressed. Some previously patriotic inmates denounced their governments and associated themselves with Japan, and factions of Nisei sought to renounce the citizenship that had failed to protect them. Inmate unrest was so pronounced in the WRA camps that it led the U.S. government to a unique and destructive official policy of segregation of "no-no boys," even as the Canadians interned groups of Nisei and "troublemakers" alongside aliens at Camp Angler. A similar sense of betrayal, matched by a practical wish to prepare as best as possible for postwar conditions, led many ethnic German and Japanese families at Crystal City to reject U.S. public school models for their children, and to educate them in the style of their past homelands. These patterns suggest that, while the official support given Japanese Americans may have helped them recover more rapidly, in both moral and financial terms, following evacuation, no official treatment, however humane, could erase the essential wound caused by their arbitrary confinement.

[5] MILITARY SERVICE AND LEGAL CHALLENGES

In spite of the limitations on their freedom during World War II, Japanese Americans were active in pressing for fair treatment, and they were ultimately able to impact decisions about official policy on a national level. The two most visible areas in which the Nisei, with their non-Japanese allies, fought to restore their group's constitutional rights were military service and the courts. The enlistment of up to 33,000 Nisei soldiers from Hawaii and the mainland in the U.S. Armed Forces during the war years, especially those who volunteered for military service from camp, rebutted widespread public images of Japanese Americans as disloyal or suspect and furnished graphic and enduring evidence of the loyalty and good citizenship of the entire group.[1] The outstanding combat record of the all-Nisei, segregated 100th Battalion/442nd Regimental Combat Team and the Nisei interpreters in the Military Intelligence Service, compiled at the horrid cost of thousands of battlefield casualties, encouraged government officials to push the release of inmates from the camps. In contrast, the protracted refusal of the Canadian government to permit enlistment of Japanese Canadians badly damaged the group's standing, though it saved many of their lives. A different kind of heroism was demonstrated by the members of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee (FPC) and other draft resisters. These Nisei refused on principle to fight until the government that had confined their families restored their civil rights, and they bravely stood up in defense of their constitutional rights at the price of prison and widespread obloquy.

The resisters movement, in turn, overlapped with a larger series of legal challenges to government control of civilians, both Japanese Americans confined under Executive Order 9066 and those subject to martial law in Hawaii. The cases of the Nisei plaintiffs who resisted curfews and evacuation in early 1942 made their way slowly through the federal courts